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IT'S NOW PERSUASION, NOT COERCION:
WHY CURRENT LAW ON LABOR PROTEST
VIOLATES TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW
Michael J. Hayes*
I. INTRODUCTION

Multiple legal scholars have discussed how, in the ongoing
"Roberts Court" era of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court has expanded
First Amendment protections in new ways and to previously unprotected
persons.1 This development has led many labor law scholars to revisit
the federal statutory restrictions on protest by unions and other labor
organizations, 2 with one important article, by Professor Catherine Fisk
and former National Labor Relations Board attorney Jessica Rutter, even
titled Labor Protest Under the New FirstAmendment.' However, in the
midst of such widespread reconsideration, the Roberts Court itself has
* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. Due to the Author's work
for the federal government from 2013 to 2016, the Author states here unequivocally that the views
expressed herein do not represent the views of any federal agency or the United States.
1. See, e.g., Charlotte Garden, The DeregulatoryFirst Amendment at Work, 51 HARV. CRCL L. REv. 323, 331-32 (2016); Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the
First Amendment, 25 J.L. & POL'Y 63, 81-104 (2016); Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment
Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1199, 1206-19 (2015). In a somewhat different
description, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has recently stated that the Roberts Court is "very protective
of freedom of speech except when the institutional interest of the government as government are
implicated. Then it's not at all protective of speech." Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment in
the EraofPresidentTrump, 94 DENV. L. REV. 553, 554 (2017).
2. See, e.g., Charlotte Garden, Citizens United and the First Amendment of Labor Law, 43
STETSON L. REv. 571, 574-80 (2014); Julius G. Getman, The NLRB: What Went Wrong and Should
We Try to Fix It?, 64 EMORY L.J. 1495, 1495, 1498-99 (2015); Ian Hayes, The Unconstitutionality
of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and the Supreme Court's Unique Treatment of Union Speech, 28 ABA J.
LAB. & EMp. L. 129, 131-34, 136-38, 140-42 (2012); Joseph L. Guza, Comment, A Cure for
Laryngitis:A FirstAmendment Challenge to the NLRA's Ban on Secondary Picketing, 59 BUFF. L.
REv. 1267, 1298-306 (2011); Zoran Tasi6, Note, The Speaker the Court Forgot: Re-Evaluating
NLRA Section 8(b)(4)(B)'s Secondary Boycott Restrictions in Light of Citizens United and Sorrell,
90 WASH. U. L. REv. 237, 245-63 (2012).

3.

Catherine Fisk & Jessica Rutter, Labor Protest Under the New First Amendment, 36

BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 277, 307-15 (2015).
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not yet looked at whether the federal limits on labor protest are fully
consistent with the First Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court
consistently found those restrictions constitutional during the last six
decades of the twentieth century.4 However, other Supreme Court
precedents, including not only those of the Roberts Court but others
dating as early as the 1960s, make questionable whether the restrictions
on labor protest are constitutionally permissible.'
The relevant precedents include not only Supreme Court decisions
applying the First Amendment to labor protest and other rulings
interpreting the First Amendment, but also Supreme Court decisions
limiting the authority of unions to discipline their members and
employees they represent. These latter precedents limiting union power
and other rules regulating union policy were regularly referred to and
researched by the Author when, from August 2013 through December
2016, he served as Director of the U.S. Labor Department's Office of
Labor-Management Standards ("OLMS"), the federal agency that
regulates internal union affairs.6 The Author has drawn on that work in
this Article's explanation and analysis of how the legislative history of
labor relations statutes and the development of agency and court
doctrines under them reveals constitutional problems with the current
rules restricting labor protest.
The fact that such problems exist has long been recognized. In
1984, Professor James G. Pope, in the course of considering the lesser
First Amendment protection afforded to labor protest as compared to
other forms of protest and expression, criticized the view that labor
protest could be limited because "unions may have the power to7
discipline their members for refusing to support a work stoppage.,
Professor Pope pointed out that this rationale was questionable when
"under current law, unions are prohibited from spending an individual
member's dues for political purposes over the member's objection, much
less from compelling a member to participate in a political boycott."8
4. See, e.g., Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 222-27 (1982);
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 491, 504 (1949); Fisk & Rutter, supra note 3,
at 296-97; Guza, supra note 2, at 1280-84; Tasi6, supra note 2, at 245-48, 250-62.
5. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 6264 (1964); Hayes, supra note 2, at 131-42.
6. It seems worth repeating here what the Author stated at the outset: the views expressed in
this Article are the personal views of the Author and do not purport to represent the official views of
the U.S. Government or any of its agents or employees.
7.

James G. Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of FirstAmendment Values: Two Rungs and a

Black Hole, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 226 & n.229 (1984) (citing Note, Labor Picketingand
Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938, 938
n.2 (1982)).
8. Id. This Article demonstrates, in Parts I and II, that the "union power to discipline"
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Professor Pope expanded on this point seven years later when he
observed in a 1991 article:
Except in the rare case of a boycott centered in a tightly knit
community of union supporters, it is no longer possible to identify and
punish consumer boycott violators-whether by formal union
discipline or social ostracism. Even in the midst of a strike, members
may now evade disciplinary sanctions simply by resigning their union
9
membership before crossing a picket line.
More recently, Professor Cynthia Estlund in her 2015 article, Are
Unions a ConstitutionalAnomaly?, pointed out that the "union power to
discipline"
rationale
for limiting
union protest is now
"illusory... because Taft-Hartley itself prohibited union-security
agreements that made union membership a condition of employment,"
and added that "a union's decision to back up a picket line with the
threat of union discipline against members who cross it should be a
matter between unions and their members within their expressive and
associational freedoms."'"
All the scholars referenced above and more have contrasted the
relatively limited First Amendment protection granted to union protest
with the broader rights of expression extended to other groups, such as
anti-discrimination protesters1 and corporations." This Article,
rationale was in fact central to the leading Supreme Court precedents relied on ever since, that held
that federal restrictions on union picketing were permissible under the First Amendment. See infra
pp. 103, 105-11. Parts III and IV of this Article also extensively discuss the changed law on union
discipline referenced by Professor Pope. See infra Parts III-IV. Part V explains why limits on union
discipline render the current rules governing federal prohibitions on labor protest outdated. See infra
Part V.
9. James Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the
New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEX. L. REV. 889, 933 & n.232 (1991) (footnote
omitted) (first citing Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 100 (1985); then citing NLRB
v. Textile Workers Union Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213, 215 (1972)).
10. Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a ConstitutionalAnomaly?, 114 MICH.L. REv. 169, 225-28
(2015). This Article contends (as Professor Pope also implied) that given the "freedoms" that union
members now enjoy with regard to union discipline, based on Supreme Court decisions such as (but
not limited to) Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985), most unions currently have
little or no practical ability to discipline a member for crossing a picket line, much less a union
handbill requesting an employee not to perform work for a union employer. See infra Part IV.
Professor Estlund, by contrast, maintained that "especially given the strong commitment to a right
of [union member] exit in cases like Pattern Makers', those who choose to remain union members,
and who have the right to participate in its collective decisions, can fairly be bound by those
decisions," including the decision to discipline members for crossing picket lines. Estlund, supra, at
226 n.277.
11. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912, 914 (1982). For a discussion
of Claiborne Hardware, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 200-02 (1985);
Estlund, supra note 10, at 202 & n.175, 214 & n.226; Fisk & Rutter, supra note 3, at 304-05;
Garden, supra note 2, at 578 & n.45; Julius Getmnan, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious
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especially in Part V, also criticizes the differential treatment of union
protest based on whether the targeted audience of such protest is or
includes employees rather than only consumers.13 Moreover, this Article
in Parts Ill and V, more than any scholarship in the past many decades,
critiques the legal doctrine of "signal picketing" that has been used to
extend the federal restrictions on union activity (which the U.S. Supreme
Court has applied only to union picketing) to multiple other forms of
labor protest.14
The Article will proceed in the following order: in Part 11 the
Article explains how nearly all National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB" or "Board") and court precedents upholding the
constitutionality of restrictions on labor protest can be traced back to
precedents that relied on unions' ability to enforce member obedience to
such protests through union discipline. 15 Next, Part III focuses on a key
development in establishing the line between lawful and unlawful union
protest-the doctrine of "signal picketing"-and thoroughly explores
and examines the origins and history of that slippery doctrine that can
and sometimes has been used to greatly expand the scope of protest
deemed unprotected by the First Amendment.1 6 That is followed by
Part IV which, building upon the above-referenced insights about the
connection between union discipline and the federal limits on labor
protest, describes how current law for practical purposes prevents unions
from imposing financial or other tangible penalties on employees who
refuse to participate in labor protests.' 7 Finally, Part V starts by
analyzing why the federal restrictions on labor protest, especially those
based on the doctrine of "signal picketing," are unconstitutional under
the First Amendment except in a narrow range of circumstances. 8 As
mentioned earlier, Part V then explains why the existing federal
restrictions on labor protest, by differentiating appeals to employees
from appeals to consumers, are unreasonable and unfair in their
treatment of workers. 9 In the course of that analysis, this Article is
the first to explain why the D.C. Circuit's 1999 precedent in
Warshawsky & Co. v. NLRB,2 which found handbilling to be
Policy of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REv. 4, 15-18 (1984); Pope, supra note 7, at 224-28.
12. See, e.g., Garden, supra note 2 passim; Pope, supra note 7, at 201-02, 223, 235-36.
13. See infra Part V.B.
14. See infra Parts fl, V.
15. See infra Part H.
16. See infra Part 11.
17. See infra Part TV.
18. See infra Part V.A.
19. See infra Part V.B.
20. 182 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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unprotected because it led some employees to refuse to perform work,
should be found unconstitutional.

1

II. THE CURRENT (PURPORTEDLY) CONSTITUTIONAL LINE
BETWEEN LAWFUL AND UNLAWFUL UNION PROTEST

The Supreme Court of the United States held in 1941 that union
picketing is protected by the First Amendment.22 Nonetheless, federal
law has restricted picketing and other forms of labor protest since
1947. 2 Congress added to and strengthened those restrictions in 195924
and 1976.25 The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of
those federal restrictions since its 1951 decision in International
Brotherhoodof Electrical Workers v. NLRB (1BEW Local 501).26 In that
ruling, the Court cited as support its prior decisions in which it upheld as
against union picketing based on
constitutional state court injunctions
27
law.
state
of
violations
alleged
In the earliest of those prior cases, the 1949 Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co. decision, the Court, in holding that the First
Amendment did not bar enjoining union picketing, relied several times
on the fact that union members could be tangibly disciplined if they
crossed the picket line. 28 The Court's summary of facts in Giboney
pointed out that, "[h]ad any one of [the union truck drivers] crossed the
picket line he would have been subject to fine or suspension by the
union of which he was a member."29 In Giboney's final paragraph,
the Court equated the State of Missouri's means of enforcing its law
21. Id.at953-56.
22. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 91-92, 95-96, 98-106 (1940) (holding that a state
antipicketing statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
23. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 8(b)(4), 61 Stat. 136,
141-42 (1947).
24. See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L.
No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519.
25. See Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 158(g)).
26. See 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951); see also Kate L. Rakoczy, Comment, On Mock Funerals,
Banners, and Giant Rat Balloons: Why Current Interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the
National Labor Relations Act UnconstitutionalityBurdens Union Speech, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1621,
1632-35 (2007) (summarizing U.S. Supreme Court decisions upholding federal restrictions on
picketing and other forms of labor protest).
27. See IBEW Local 501, 341 U.S. at 705 & n.10 (first citing Bldg. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union,
Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 538-39, 541 (1950); then citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local
309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 475-78, 480-81 (1950); then citing Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S.
460, 465-66, 468-69 (1950); and then citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490,
501-04 (1949)).
28. Giboney, 336 U.S. at 493,497-98, 504.
29. Id. at 493.
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with the means the union had to enforce its picket line and that
picketing's purpose:
Missouri has by statute regulated trade one way. The appellant union
members have adopted a program to regulate it another way. The state
has provided for enforcement of its statutory rule by imposing civil and
criminal sanctions. The union has provided for enforcement30 of its rule
by sanctions against union members who cross picket lines.
The importance of a union's disciplinary power over picket line
crossers was reinforced by the Court the following year in Gazzam3"
(another decision the Court relied on in IBEWLocal 50132). In Gazzam,
the Court stated that "Giboney controls the disposition of this case," and
after quoting Giboney's reference to union picketing involving
"economic power," the Court in Gazzam stated, "[h]ere, as in Giboney,
the union was using its economic power.., to compel respondent to
abide by union policy rather than by the declared policy of the State."33
The union economic power referenced in Giboney and Gazzam is
inseparable from the power of unions, at that time, to fine and otherwise
tangibly discipline picket line crossers.3 4 A power that, as more fully
discussed in Part IV of this Article, is in the twenty-first century much
diminished from what it was in 1949 and 1950.11
U.S. Supreme Court Justices shed additional light on the First
Amendment issues raised by federal restrictions on picketing in the
Court's first decision limiting the scope of those statutory restrictionsits 1964 decision, NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers,Local 760 (Tree
3 6 In that decision,
Fruits).
the Court held that the NLRB had erred in
finding that Section 8(b)(4)'s prohibitions on secondary activity covered
a union's picketing of a secondary retail store employer when the
picketing was limited to persuading customers of that store to refrain
from buying a product of a primary employer with whom that union had
a dispute.3 7 The Court thus held that Section 8(b)(4) did not apply to
such "struck product" picketing of a secondary employer.3 8 The Court
majority's opinion, by Justice Brennan, observed that "a broad ban
30. Id. at 504.
31. Gazzam, 339 U.S. at 536-39, 540-41.
32. IBEW Local 501, 341 U.S. at 705 & n.10.
33. Gazzam, 339 U.S. at 540 (citation omitted) (citing Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502-03).
34. The Hughes decision-also relied on in IBEW Local 501--did not involve picketing or
labor protest by a union but rather picketing by a group named "Progressive Citizens of America."
Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 461-62 (1950).
35. See infra Part TV.
36. 377 U.S. 58, 63-64, 71-73 (1964).
37. Id. at 61-64, 71-72.
38. See id. at 63.
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against peaceful picketing might collide with the guarantees of the First
Amendment."3 9 Relying on analysis of the legislative history of the
Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") prohibitions on secondary
activity, the majority interpreted those provisions to be not so broad as to
prohibit the "consumer picketing" at issue in the case.4" Justice Black in
his concurrence, and Justices Harlan and Stewart in their dissent,
disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the statute, which they
found did prohibit the "struck product," consumer picketing at issue in
the case.41 Justice Black, however, found that the prohibition violated the
First Amendment. 42
Justice Black relied on Justice Douglas's concurrence in Bakery &
Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, a 1942 decision in which the Court
struck down a New York State prohibition on picketing, 43 to describe
most picketing as a combination of "patrolling" and of speech "made 'to4
persuade other people to take the picketers' side of a controversy.
Justice Black reasoned that "when conduct not constitutionally
protected, like patrolling, is intertwined, as in picketing, with
constitutionally protected free speech and press, regulation of the nonprotected conduct may at the same time encroach on freedom of speech
and press. 45 Justice Black found such encroachment by Section 8(b)(4)
because "it is difficult to see that [this section] intends to do anything but
prevent dissemination of information about the facts of a labor disputea right protected by the First Amendment. '46 Section 8(b)(4), Justice
Black pointed out, does not regulate persons who "patrol" for any other
purpose but to publicize labor disputes. 47 Therefore, Justice Black
concluded, "we have a case in which picketing, otherwise lawful, is
banned only when the picketers express particular views. The result is an
abridgment of the freedom of these picketers to tell a part of the public
their side of a labor controversy, a subject the free discussion of which is
protected by the First Amendment."4 8

39. Id. at 59, 63.
40. Id. at 63-72.
41. Id. at 76, 78-79 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 82-84, 88, 92 (Harlan & Stewart, JJ.,
dissenting).
42. Id. at 78-80 (Black, J., concurring).
43. See Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 773-75 (1942).
44. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 77 (Black, J., concurring) (citing Wohl, 315 U.S. at 776 (Douglas,
J., concurring)).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 78.
47. Id. at 79.
48. Id.
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As noted above, the dissenting opinion by Justice Harlan joined by
Justice Stewart disagreed with the majority's statutory interpretation,
finding on the basis of statutory language and legislative history that
"[n]othing in the statute lends support to the fine distinction which the
Court draws between general and limited product picketing., 49 Of more
relevance to this Article, Justice Harlan also responded to Justice
Black's opinion that Section 8(b)(4) violated the First Amendment."
Justice Harlan invoked three Supreme Court precedents in which, he
said, the Court "recognized that picketing is 'inseparably something
more [than] and different' from simple communication."5 1 For this
proposition, Justice Harlan cited a specific page from Justice Douglas's
concurring opinion in Wohl, along with another Supreme Court
decision-Hughesv. Superior Court-whichalso cited that same page.52
Justice Harlan's citations suggest he was referring to Justice Douglas's
statement in his Wohl concurrence: "Picketing by an organized group is
more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and
since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or
another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being
disseminated."53 That Justice Harlan was referring to the "noncommunicative"
aspects of picketing is further supported
in his dissent, in which he maintained that Congress's
"attempts" to "limit[] a form of communication likely to have effects
caused by something apartfrom the message communicated' should be
given "great deference."54
The Supreme Court found it necessary to modify Tree Fruits's rule
that "struck product" picketing was outside the prohibition of Section
8(b)(4),55 in its 1980 decision in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union,

49. Id. at 82, 84 (Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
50. See id. at 93-94.
51. Id. at 93 (quoting Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464 (1950)).
52. See id. (quoting Hughes, 339 U.S. at 464-65) (citing Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802
v. wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
53. See id; Wohl, 315 U.S. at 776 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). The third
precedent that Justice Harlan cited was Building Service Employees InternationalUnion, Local 262
v. Gazzam, which did cite Wohl in general, but did not cite any of the pages containing Justice
Douglas's concurrence or refer to that opinion. See Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537 (1950).
However, on the page that Justice Harlan referenced in Gazzam, the Court's majority, like Justice
Douglas in Wohl, said it was not the message conveyed but the "induc[ement of] action" that made
permissible legal restrictions on picketing: "[P]icketing is more than speech and establishes a locus
in quo that has far more potential for inducing action or nonaction than the message the pickets
convey." Id.; Wohl, 315 U.S. at 776 (Douglas, J., concurring).
54. Tree Fruits,377 U.S. at 93, 94 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 70-72 (majority opinion); NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union, Local 1001 (Safeco),
447 U.S. 607, 611-16 (1980).
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Local 1001 (Safeco)6 In that case, the "struck product" targeted in the
union's picketing of secondary employers was the only product sold by
those secondary, neutral employers." The Court found this
distinguishable from Tree Fruits,in which the struck product was "one
item among the many" sold by the secondary." By contrast, in Safeco,
the union's picketing against the only product the secondaries sold
meant that the picketing sought "to induce customers not to patronize
the neutral parties at all," which the Court found was forbidden
by Section 8(b)(4).5 9
Justice Stevens authored a concurring opinion in which he
addressed the First Amendment issue, which he noted had been raised by
Justice Black in Tree Fruits, that under Section 8(b)(4) "picketing,
otherwise lawful, is banned only when the picketers express particular
views."6 Justice Stevens concluded that Section 8(b)(4)'s content-based
restriction on picketing was constitutional because it "affects only that
aspect of the union's efforts to communicate its views that calls for an
automatic response to a signal, rather than a reasoned response to an
idea."" Interestingly, given the Court's Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council decision on
handbilling eight years later,62 and NLRB and court decisions discussed
in this Article's next Part that found handbilling to be prohibited by
Section 8(b)(4),63 Justice Stevens in his concurrence stated that union
handbills, in contrast to picketing, "depend entirely on the persuasive
4
force of the idea."'6
The Supreme Court relied on its 1980 decision in Safeco two years
later in International Longshoremen's Association v. Allied
International,Inc. 65 In that decision, the Court unanimously held that the
International Longshoreman's Association violated Section 8(b)(4) when
its president ordered its members "to stop handling cargoes arriving
from or destined for" what was then the Soviet Union, to protest that

56.
57.
58.
59.
(1976)).
60.

Safeco, 447 U.S. at 616.
Id.at 613.
Id.
Id. at 613-14 (quoting Retail Store Emps. Union Local 1001, 226 N.L.R.B. 754, 757
Id.at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 79 (Black, J.,

concurring)).
61. Id.at 618-19.

62. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 588 (1988).

63. See infra text accompanying notes 320-29, 400-02.
64. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring).
65. 456 U.S. 212, 226-27 (1982).
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country's invasion of Afghanistan.66 In the final substantive paragraph of
Justice Powell's opinion, in one of the three places in that paragraph in
which he cited the Safeco opinion, Justice Powell quoted part of Justice
Stevens's concurrence in Safeco (also quoted in the immediately
preceding paragraph of this Article) declaring that "[t]he statutory ban in
this case affects only that aspect of the union's efforts to communicate
its views that calls for an automatic response to a signal, rather than a
reasoned response to an idea. '67 Justice Powell's third and final Safeco
citation was to Justice Blackmun's concurrence in order to support his
proposition that "[t]he labor laws reflect a careful balancing of
interests. '68 The final sentence of Justice Powell's opinion identified the
"interests" that were "balanced": namely, the union and its members'
rights of expression (in this case to demonstrate "their opposition to
Russian foreign policy") on the one hand, weighed against the form of
expression "infringing upon the rights of others" 69 (those rights being
secondary parties' rights to engage in commerce that was interrupted by
the union7") on the other hand.
Six years after Allied Internationaland eight years after Safeco, the
Supreme Court considered in DeBartolo7 whether a union's protest in
the form of handbilling should be prohibited under Section 8(b)(4).72
The NLRB had found that the union (a building trades council) had
violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii) when, to protest that a non-union contractor
had built one store in a shopping center, that union distributed handbills
urging the public not to shop at any store within the shopping center
because that non-union contractor had paid "substandard" wages and
fringe benefits.73 In that decision, the Board "presume[d] the
constitutionality" of Section 8(b)(4) and explained that for that reason it
did not discuss the First Amendment issue.7 4 The Eleventh Circuit, on
First Amendment grounds, ruled in favor of the union and denied
enforcement of the Board's order.75
66. Id. at 214, 217-18, 226-27.
67. Id. at 226 & n.26 (emphasis added) (quoting Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
68. Id.at 226-27 (citing Safeco, 447 U.S. at 617-18 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
69. Id. at 227.
70. See id at 218-19 (discussing how the union interfered with the commerce of the
plaintiffs).
71.

Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.

568 (1988).
72. See id at 570-74.
73. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. Trades Council, 273 N.L.R.B. 1431, 1431-32 (1985).
74. Id.at 1432.
75. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 1328, 1332-36, 1346
(llth Cir. 1986).
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The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Eleventh Circuit 76
and broadly ruled that peaceful appeals to consumers, such as through
handbilling, that do not involve picketing are not prohibited by
Section 8(b)(4) of the Act.77 The Court's opinion, by Justice White,
applied the rule of construction that "where an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the
Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. ' 78 Based on
the Court's interpretation of Section 8(b)(4) in Tree Fruits, its
construction of statutory language, and its examination of the legislative
history of Section 8(b)(4), the Court found that there was no "clear
intent" by Congress for "nonpicketing appeals to customers urging a
secondary boycott" to be unlawful, even if they harmed secondary,
neutral enterprises. 79 With regard to harm to neutrals, the Court
distinguished Safeco, summarized above, on the ground that Safeco
involved picketing, and "picketing is qualitatively 'different from other
modes of communication.""'8 To explain how picketing was
"qualitatively different" from handbilling, the Court relied on Justice
Stevens's concurrence in Safeco, also described above-specifically the
language that "[h]andbills containing the same message [as
picketing] ... are 'much less effective than labor picketing' because
they 'depend entirely on the persuasive force of the idea."' 8
The Court in DeBartolo expressly mentioned that "[t]he handbills
made clear that the union was seeking only a consumer boycott against
the other mall tenants, not a secondary strike by their employees,"82 and
the Court throughout that decision referred to it as applying to
"consumer publicity" and union appeals for "consumer boycotts." 3
DeBartolo thus left open whether handbilling and other non-picketing
publicity intended to cause, and/or with the effect of causing, employees
of secondary employers to refrain from working could be prohibited by
Section 8(b)(4). That issue was addressed in 1999 by a split three-judge
panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Warshawsky & Co. v.
76. DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 588. Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia concurred in the
judgment, and Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
77. See id at 578, 582-84, 588.
78. Id.at 575.
79. Id. at 577-79, 581-89.
80. Id. at 579-80 (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 311
n.17 (1979) (quoting Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950))).
81. Id. at 580 (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S.
607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
82. Id.at571.
83. Id.passim.
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NLRB.8 4 The D.C. Circuit's position on this issue, as on all issues under
the LMRA, is especially important because the D.C. Circuit is the only
federal appellate court to which all decisions of the NLRB can be
appealed, and thus the only such court to which any and all parties
"aggrieved" by a Board decision can appealY In fact, in its Warshawsky
decision, the D.C. Circuit denied enforcement of a Board decision86 that
had held that union handbilling did not violate Section 8(b)(4) even
though some employees of secondary employers responded by not
performing work.87
The court's opinion by Judge Silberman, joined by Judge
Henderson, reasoned that there was no First Amendment issue to avoid
in this case because of the employees' cessation of work, which the
majority found meant that the union's handbilling involved
Section 8(b)(4)(i), which makes it unlawful for unions or their agents "to
engage in, or to induce or encourage.., a strike" for unlawful
objectives.88 In DeBartolo, by contrast, the Supreme Court interpreted
Section 8(b)(4)(ii), which provides that unions and their agents cannot
"threaten, coerce, or restrain any person" for an unlawful object. 89 While
in DeBartolo the Supreme Court avoided a First Amendment issue by
finding that Section 8(b)(4)(ii) did not cover union handbills appealing
to consumers not to shop, 9° the Warshawsky majority, relying on the
Supreme Court's 1951 decision in IBEW Local 50191 (discussed above
and again below in Part V.A 92), held that no First Amendment issue was
raised by Section 8(b)(4)(i) prohibiting union handbills intended to and
with the effect of causing employees to refrain from working.93 The
Warshawsky majority concluded based on its review of the facts (and by
dismissing language on the handbills that stated that the union was not
seeking any person to "cease work" as being in "very small print"' ) that
the employees to strike
the Board's ruling that the union did not induce
95
was not supported by "substantial evidence."

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
U.S. 568,
90.

182 F.3d 948, 952-56 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2012).
Warshawsky, 182 F.3d at 956.
Iron Workers Local 386, 325 N.L.R.B. 748, 752-53, 756-77 (1998).
See Warshawsky, 182 F.3d at 950-52 & n.2.
See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
577-78, 583-86 (1988).
Id.

91.

IBEWLoca1 501, 341 U.S. 694 (1951).

92.
93.

See supra text accompanying notes 23-27; infra text accompanying notes 486-91.
Warshawsky, 182 F.3d at 951-53.

94.

See id. at 954.

95.

Id. at 953-56.
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Judge Wald dissented, finding that the majority's opinion "sets
forth new constitutional law restricting the reach and protection of the
First Amendment."9' 6 Judge Wald discussed the DeBartolo opinion's
explanation of "the difference, constitutionally speaking, between
pickets and handbills," including the point, which DeBartolo borrowed
from
Justice
Stevens's
concurrence
in
Safeco,
that
"[h]andbills... 'depend entirely on the persuasive force of the idea." 7
Judge Wald also noted that the Court in DeBartolo held that the
"publicity proviso" to Section 8(b)(4) was a "clarification" of that
Section, and she observed that this clarification included that "the
public" to whom unions can communicate "includ[es] consumers and
members of a labor organization."9' 8 In criticizing the majority's view of
the scope of First Amendment protection, Judge Wald stated:
"Surprisingly, the majority seems to be saying that the First Amendment
is not implicated at all when a union communicates solely with neutral
employees. There is no support for this belief."99 Judge Wald found that
"[t]he majority jump[ed] from the Supreme Court's holding that the
prohibition under section 8(b)(4) of the inducement or encouragement of
a secondary work stoppage does not constitute an unconstitutional
abridgment of free speech to its conclusion that any kind of union speech
directed to neutral employees carries no First Amendment protection.", °°
Judge Wald pointed out that a union might have multiple reasons, other
than to encourage cessation of work, to communicate by handbill with
members of labor organizations (and other employees) who work for a
secondary employer about a "primary employer" with whom the union
has a dispute.10 Thus, Judge Wald concluded that the majority had erred
in assuming that a union communicating with employees of neutral
employers must have an illegal intent. °2
Four years after the D.C. Circuit's Warshawsky decision, in May
2003, President George W. Bush's first appointee as NLRB General
Counsel, Arthur Rosenfeld, issued a "Report on Recent Case
Developments."' 3 In Part II of that report, under the heading
96. Id. at 958 (Wald, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 959-60 (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 580 (1988) (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union, Local 1001
(Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring))).
98. Id.at 960 (quoting National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)
(1994)).
99. Id. at 961.
100. Id. (citing IBEWLocal 501, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951)).
101. Id.at961-62.
102. Id.at 961-62, 964-65.
103. Press Release, Arthur F. Rosenfeld, Gen. Counsel, NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel,
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"Secondary Boycotts: Inflated Rat as 'Signal Picketing,"' he
summarized a case in which his Office had issued a complaint against a
union for allegedly violating Section 8(b)(4)(i). °4 In that case, a union
agent informed an employer, a construction general contractor, that the
10 5
union "would 'take [the Employer] down if it doesn't go union.'
Shortly afterward, a total of thirty individuals wearing union jackets
brought large inflated rats to two separate construction sites overseen by
that contractor.10 6 While the inflated rats were at the sites, some supplier
drivers refused to make deliveries. 7 According to a statement by one
supplier to the general contractor, the supplier had said "that when his
drivers see rats, they understand that there is a 'job action' and that they
cannot cross the 'picket line."' 1 8 Also, some of the employees of
subcontractors working on the sites left them or refused to enter them
"because they would not cross the 'picket line.""'1 9 Relying on
statements by employees given during the investigation, news reports
regarding inflatable rats, and a reference to an inflated rat in the fictional
TV show The Sopranos,the General Counsel's Office concluded that the
inflated rat "is a symbol of a labor dispute" and that the union's
the two construction sites
displaying inflated rats near the entrances to
' 110
was "the functional equivalent of picketing."
To further explain (and justify) this conclusion of "functional
equivalence," the General Counsel relied on the principle of "signal
picketing."' 11 The summary explained that "[t]he Board has long used
the doctrine of 'signal picketing' to describe union conduct that did not
involve traditional picketing but could be characterized as 'picketing'
because it evokes the same response as a traditional picket line."1' 12 As
examples of "signal picketing," the summary mentioned a case in which
union business agents were stationed near a workplace entrance, and a
case where union placards were placed, with no persons near them, near

NLRB General Counsel Arthur Rosenfeld Issues Report on Recent Case Developments (May 2,
2003). All descriptions of this case come from the summary in this Report.
By what the Author assures all readers is a coincidence, former General Counsel
Rosenfeld was appointed as the first Director since the author of the Labor Department's Office of
Labor-Management Standards.
104. See id.pt. I.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. Id.
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a workplace entrance." 3 According to the General Counsel, "[t]he
inflatable rat in this case served the same function," as "[n]eutral
employees would assume that a picket line existed."1' 14
Three years after this General Counsel report, in 2006, the NLRB
held that a union violated Section 8(b)(4) when its agents walked back
and forth at entrances to a secondary employer's construction site while
distributing handbills." 5 The Board declared that the fact that the
union's agents were distributing handbills instead of carrying traditional
picket signs or placards was "not controlling," and stated: "Picketing
may be found to occur where a small number of persons actively engage
in patrolling-back and forth movement-establishing a form of barrier
' 6
at the site in question." "
The Board majority added in a footnote: "While the picketing in
this case involved patrolling, the Board has held that 'neither patrolling
alone nor patrolling combined with the carrying of placards are essential
elements to a finding of picketing; rather[,] the "important" or essential
feature of picketing is the posting of individuals at entrances to a place
of work."'1 17 This kind of equating of union agents' presence at an
entrance of a workplace with picketing is often referred to by the term
"signal picketing," a legal principle that is discussed more fully in the
next Part of this Article. 8 However, the Board in the The Ranches at
Mount Sinai decision used the phrase "signal picketing" only when they
were noting that they were not taking a position on the administrative
law judge's ("AL") ruling that the union's placing of an inflated rat
near the worksite entrance was in itself "signal picketing."' 19 In a
footnote equating presence at workplace entrance with picketing,
Member Liebman expressed a separate view, stating that "picketing
is... some form of conduct that effectively creates a physical or
symbolic barrier... [and] picketing is defined not by the mere presence
of individuals, but by conduct that results in a coercive confrontation."' 20
113. Id (first citing United Mine Workers, Dist. 2, 334 N.L.R.B. 677, 686 (2001); then citing
Sheet Metal Workers, Local Union No. 19 (DelcardAssociates), 316 N.L.R.B. 426, 437-438
(1995), petitionfor enforcement denied on other grounds, 154 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 1998)).

114. Id.
115.

Laborers' E. Region Org. Fund (The Ranches at Mt. Sinai), 346 N.L.R.B. 1251, 1251-52

(2006).
116. Id.at 1253.
117. Id. at 1253 n.5 (quoting Serv. Emps. Union, Local 87 (Trinity Maintenance), 312
N.L.R.B. 715, 743 (1993)).

118. See infra Part lil.
119.

The Ranches at Mt. Sinai, 346 N.L.R.B at 1251, 1253.

120. Id. at 1253 n.5 (first citing Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 15, 346 N.L.R.B. 199,
200 (2006) (Liebman, Member, concurring); then citing Chi. Typographical Union No. 16 (Alden
Press), 151 N.L.R.B. 1666, 1669 (1965) ("The Board has held that not all patrolling constitutes
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Member Liebman had first expressed this view of the meaning of
"picketing" earlier in 2006 in a separate concurrence in the NLRB
decision of Sheet Metal Workers Local 15.121 In that decision, Member
Liebman, along with Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber, held
that a union violated Section 8(b)(4) when its agents "patroll[ed]" on a
public sidewalk in front of the secondary medical center during a "mock
funeral procession," during which some union agents engaged in
handbilling while others were "carrying a faux casket and accompanied
by a[n agent] dressed as the Grim Reaper. ' 122 Member Liebman in her
concurrence relied on the 2005 Ninth Circuit decision in Overstreet ex
rel. NLRB v. United Brotherhoodof Carpenters,Local Union No. 1506
(Carpenters Local 1506)123 to assert that "ambulatory picketing or
patrolling classically involves more than the 'mere persuasion' of a
banner, it also involves the intimidation of a physical or symbolic barrier
to the entrance way. "124 Applying this view to the case at hand, Member
Liebman stated:
The gravamen of the violation is not that patrollers carried a faux
casket and a costumed "grim reaper" figure carrying a large sickle, for
these expressive displays offer "mere persuasion" and do not serve to
erect a physical or symbolic barrier to the Medical Center's entrance.
Rather, it is the patrolling itself that erected a barrier to entering the
hospital. 125
Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber stated that they agreed
with Member Liebman as to "why this conduct was picketing," but "to
the extent that she implies that picketing requires a physical or symbolic
barrier," they "d[id] not necessarily agree., 126 They explained that
"[s]ince the funeral procession was such a barrier, we need not pass on
whether such a barrier is a sine qua non of picketing., 12 7 They added that
"[i]t may be that other conduct, short of a barrier, can be 'conduct' that
is picketing or at least 'restraint or coercion' within the meaning of
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). '12 8

'One of the necessary conditions of "picketing"
picketing in the statutory meaning of that term. ....
is a confrontation in some form'...." (citation omitted))).
121. 346 N.L.R.B. at 200 (Liebman, Member, concurring).
122. Id. at 199-200 (majority opinion).
123. 409 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2005).
124. Sheet Metal Workers Local 15, 346 N.L.R.B. at 200 (Liebman, Member, concurring)
(quoting CarpentersLocal 1506, 409 F.3d at 1211).
125. Id.
126. Id.(majority opinion).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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As it turned out, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit did not
agree with any of these positions. In its 2007 decision by a three-judge
panel, the D.C. Circuit granted the union's appeal and denied
enforcement of the Board's decision. 129 Relying on the Supreme Court's
1988 decision in DeBartolo,3 ' and noting that the union agents'
3
handbilling and "mock funeral" were directed at consumers,' ' the D.C.
Circuit held that these activities would not constitute or be equated with
"picketing" unless they were "coercive."' 3 2 The court found that the
handbilling and mock funeral "had none of the coercive character of
picketing" because the union agents "did not physically or verbally
interfere with or confront [the secondary employer] patrons coming and
going" and, especially as the "mock funeral" was 100 feet away from the
secondary employer's entrance, they did not "'patrol' the area in the
sense of creating a symbolic barrier to those who would enter" and had
not "in any other way interfered with or confronted patrons entering or
leaving the [secondary employer]."' 3 3 The D.C. Circuit then declared its
finding that "the mock funeral lies somewhere between the lawful
handbilling in DeBartolo and unlawful picketing or patrolling," and that
the question whether it was unlawfully "coercive, threatening,
restraining, or 'intimidating,"" 134 "must be answered consistent with
developments in the Supreme Court's [F]irst [A]mendment
jurisprudence."'1 35 As examples of such jurisprudence, the D.C. Circuit
relied on 1994 and 2000 Supreme Court rulings on protests at abortion
provider sites and found that "the Union's protest was consistent with
the limitations upheld as constitutional-the buffer zones and the ban on
confrontational conduct" and comparable in other ways to facts deemed
guidance in abortion protest cases, with
relevant by the Supreme Court's
136
complied.
had
union
the
which
Both this D.C. Circuit decision in Sheet Metal Workers Local 15
and Member Liebman's concurrence in the NLRB decision of that case
relied on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Carpenters

129. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 440 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
130. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568 (1988). For a discussion of this decision, see supra text accompanying notes 71-83.
131. Sheet Metal Workers Local 15, 491 F.3d at 437.

132.

Id.at 436-38.

Id. at 437-38.
Id. at 438 (citing DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 580).
Id.
136. Id. at 436, 439 (comparing the facts of Madsen v. Women's Health Center and Hill v.
Colorado (first citing Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 758, 770, 773-74, 776
(1994); then citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707, 712, 735 (2000))).
133.
134.
135.
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Local 1506.117 In that case, the Ninth Circuit upheld a federal district
court's denial of an NLRB Regional Director's request that a union's
agents be enjoined from posting banners referencing a "labor dispute" at
locations visible to customers of secondary retailer employers.138 The
Ninth Circuit found that the banners were entitled to the same First
Amendment protection as the handbills at issue in DeBartolo, reasoning
that though those handbills "contained a more complete argument
favoring the union's position than do banners," the banners' "pithiness,
however, does not remove [them] from the scope of First Amendment
protections, as cases regarding well known short slogans
demonstrate."' 3 9 Again comparing the banners to the handbilling in
DeBartolo, the court found, as Member Liebman later referenced in the
NLRB decision of Sheet Metal Workers Local 15,140 that the union's
"bannering does not involve patrolling in front of an entrance way and
therefore erects no symbolic barrier in front of the [secondary
employers'] doorways." 14 ' The court further pointed out that the banners
were not placed so as to block entrances or the walkways approaching
those entrances, and that the union's agents did not engage in any
"behavior that could be regarded as threatening or coercive-no
taunting, no massing of a large number of people, no following of the
[secondary employers'] patrons."' 42
The court added: "That the union members are physically present,
holding up the banner, does not affect this conclusion. The handbillers in
DeBartolo were also on the scene, able to communicate by their
presence some greater degree of moral suasion, perhaps, than the words
on their pamphlets standing alone." 14' 3 Later, the court stated that "[t]he
union members simply stood by their banners, acting as human
signposts," so "[j]ust as members of the public can 'avert[ their] eyes'
from billboards or movie screens visible from a public street, they could
ignore the [union members] and the union's banners.""' The court also
rejected the Regional Director's argument that the banners constituted

137. See id at 438 (citing Overstreet ex rel. NLRB v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local Union
No. 1506 (CarpentersLocal 1506), 409 F.3d 1199, 1213-16 (9th Cir. 2005)); Sheet Metal Workers
Int'l Ass'n, Local 15, 346 N.L.R.B. 199, 200 (2006) (Liebman, Member, concurring) (citing
CarpentersLocal 1506, 409 F.3d at 1211).
138. CarpentersLocal 1506, 409 F.3d at 1201.
139. Id. at 1211 (first citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971); then citing
Cochran v. Veneman, 359 F.3d 263, 266-68, 273-80 (3d Cir. 2004)).
140. See Sheet Metal Workers Local 15, 346 N.L.R.B. at 200 (Liebman, Member, concurring).
141. CarpentersLocal 1506, 409 F.3d at 1211.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.at 1214 (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 (1975)).
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"signal picketing," which the court defined as "involving more than
mere speech" because it would occur in a context in which "[t]he failure
of a union member to comply could lead to formal union discipline or
informal sanctions by other union members."' 4 5 The court declared that
"'signals,' in this context, are 'official directions or instructions to a
' 146 The court
union's own members,' implicitly backed up by sanctions.'
reasoned that "[t]o broaden the definition of 'signal picketing' to include
'signals' to any passerby would turn the specialized concept of 'signal
picketing' into a category synonymous with any communication
requesting support in a labor dispute[, and i]f 'signal picketing' were
defined so broadly, then the handbilling in DeBartolo would have been
deemed signal picketing.' 47 Since the court found that the union's
banners were directed at the public, not to union members or employees,
148
it held that the doctrine of "signal picketing" was inapplicable. For
these reasons, the court concluded that it was unlikely that the Regional
Director could prove that the union's bannering was tantamount to
"picketing" or "signal picketing," and therefore denied the request for
149
an injunction.
In the twenty years after the Supreme Court decided DeBartolo in
1988 (as the decisions from that period discussed above demonstrate),
courts and the NLRB differed on how to apply the DeBartolo decision to
handbilling, and how to apply it to what the D.C. Circuit in Sheet
Metal Workers Local 15 referred to as protest conduct "somewhere
picketing."15
unlawful
handbilling... and
between ... lawful
Moreover, Board members disagreed with each other on where to draw
the line between protest conduct protected by the First Amendment and
conduct prohibited by Section 8(b)(4). Through much of the final eight
years of that period, during the administration of President George W.
Bush, the Office of the General Counsel (including Regional Directors)
frequently argued for application of the doctrine of "signal picketing" to
hold labor protest conduct unprotected by the First Amendment and
unlawful under the LMRA.' 5' Although multiple NLRB ALJs did, at the
General Counsel's urging, use the signal picketing doctrine to find union
145. Id. at 1215 (citing S.F. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary Workers, 203 N.L.R.B. 719, 728
(1973) (describing signal picketing as "backed by group discipline")).
146. Id. at 1215 (emphasis omitted) (quoting NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 341 U.S. 675, 691 (1951)).
147. Id. (emphases omitted).
148. Id. at 1215-16.
149. Id.at 1201, 1216.
150. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 438 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
151. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 103, at pt. II; supra notes 103-14 and accompanying
text.
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protest unlawful, 152 the Board consistently declined to rule on the scope
of that doctrine and based its decisions on other grounds. 5 3
The Board took a different approach to these issues after the
appointees of President Barack Obama took office and became a
majority of the Board. The Board's lead decision was their 2010
decision in United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local Union No. 1506
(Eliason & Knuth of Arizona).'54 The Board majority, consisting of
Chairman Liebman, then-Member Pearce, and Member Becker (all
appointed to their positions by President Barack Obama),' 55 declaring
the issue one of "first impression," held that the union's bannering did
not violate Section 8(b)(4).' 5 6 Members Schaumber and Hayes, who
were appointed by President George W. Bush, dissented and found the
union's bannering to be unlawful.' 57
In the four-paragraph introduction to the majority's opinion, the
majority-like the Supreme Court in DeBartolo (and based largely on
DeBartolo)-invoked the doctrine of "constitutional avoidance" as
justifying their conclusion that bannering did not violate Section
8(b)(4). 158 The majority reasoned: "Governmental regulation of
nonviolent speech-such as the display of stationary bannersimplicates the core protections of the First Amendment. The crucial
question here, therefore, is whether the display of a stationary banner
must be held to violate Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) .... ,159 The majority then
decided: "Nothing in the language of the Act or its legislative history
requires the Board to find a violation and thus present for judicial review
the constitutionality of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) as applied to the peaceful
152. See, e.g., Mid-Atl. Reg'l Council of Carpenters, JD(MD)-16-06, Case No. 5-CC-1289, at
*5, *16-18 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Mar. 2, 2006), rev'd, 356 N.L.R.B. 61 (2010); Laborers' E.
Region Org. Fund, JD(NY)-22-05, Case No. 29-CC-1422, 2005 WL 1467350, at *14, *16-18
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 14, 2005); Local Union No. 1827, United Bhd. of Carpenters,
JD(SF)-30-03, Case No. 28-CC-933, at *43, *54 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges May 9, 2003), rev'd, 357
N.L.R.B. 415 (2011). The Board decision in Laborers' Eastern Region Organizing Fund was
discussed earlier in this Part. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Dist. Council 711, Int'l Union of Painters, 351 N.L.R.B. 1139, 1139 n.2 (2007)
(finding it unnecessary to rule on the union's argument that "merely holding banners" was
unlawful); The Ranches at Mt. Sinai, 346 N.L.R.B. 1251, 1253 (2006) (declining to adopt the AL's
finding that an inflated rat was "signal picketing"); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 15, 346
N.L.R.B. 199, 199 (2006) (declining to decide whether inflated rat constituted "picketing").
154. 355 N.L.R.B. 797 (2010).
155. Chairman Wilma Liebman was in the midst of a five-year reappointment by President
George W. Bush when, on January 20, 2009, she was designated Chairman of the Board by
President Barack Obama. See Wilma B. Liebman, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-weare/board/wilma-b-liebman (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
156. Eliason & Knuth ofAriz., 355 N.L.R.B. at 797.
157. Id.at8ll-12,815,821.
158. Id. at 797.
159. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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display of a stationary banner" because' such bannering, like the
handbilling in DeBartolo, is "noncoercive. 160
The majority also addressed the General Counsel's legal theories
for finding the banners to be unlawful. 16' According to the majority, the
General Counsel's main arguments/theories for why banners announcing
a labor dispute with a secondary employer are unlawful include: (1) such
banners constitute "picketing" for purposes of Section 8(b)(4) because
"picketing exists where a union posts individuals at or near the entrance
to a place of business for the purpose of influencing customers,
suppliers, and employees to support the union's position in a labor
dispute," and "the posting of individuals in this fashion is inherently
confrontational"; 6 and/or (2) "even if the banners did not constitute
proscribed picketing, they constituted 'signal picketing,' that is, 'activity
short of a true picket line, which acts as a signal that sympathetic
action' should be taken by unionized employees of the secondary or its
business partners. ' 63
The majority's response to the General Counsel's first line of
argument, that bannering met the legal definition of picketing, was that
the General Counsel's definition of "picketing" and also of
"confrontation" were too broad because they did not require "the use of
traditional picket signs or any form of patrolling." 1" The majority
reasoned that the General Counsel's definition of proscribed union
conduct-the posting of union agents near business location entrances to
influence customers and others to support the union-was so broad as to
cover the union handbilling the Supreme Court found to be
constitutionally protected in DeBartolo.165 With the definition of illegal
conduct the General Counsel proposed, the majority asserted that "the
General Counsel ignores the imperative, created by the words of the
[LMRA] as well as the principle of constitutional avoidance, to

160. Id.
161. Seeid.at799.
162. Id. at 803 (referencing arguments quoted in General Counsel's brief).
163. Id. at 804-05 (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 98 (The Telephone Man, Inc.),
327 N.L.R.B. 593, 593 n.3 (1999)) (referencing arguments quoted in General Counsel's brief). It
should be noted that the dissenters asserted that the General Counsel did not argue that the banners
were "signal picketing" directed at employees. See id.at 815 n.24 (Schaumber & Hayes, Members,
dissenting). It is unclear why the dissent thought this was relevant, given how the majority pointed
out that the U.S. Supreme Court had found that secondary handbilling does not violate
Section 8(b)(4), and any "signal" to customers could be made more strongly by handbillers than by
more distant banners. Id.at 799-805.

164.
165.

Id. at 803.
Id.
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distinguish between actions the impact of which rests on persuasion and
166
actions whose influence depend on coercion.
Thus, the majority found that conduct must be "coercive" to be
prohibited by Section 8(b)(4). 16 7 And the majority's standard for finding
coercion, at least with regard to "signs" used by union agents, was
the following:
The core conduct that renders picketing coercive ... is not simply the

holding of signs (in contrast to the distribution of handbills), but the
combination of carrying of picket signs and persistent patrolling of the
picketers back and forth in front of an entrance to a work site, creating
a physical or, at least, a symbolic
confrontation between the picketers
168
and those entering the worksite.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, this standard for defining "picketing" or
"picket-like" conduct is similar to the definition that then-Member
Liebman stated she was applying in 2006 in Sheet Metal Workers Local
15 and The Ranches at Mount Sinai.169 The majority acknowledged that
some prior Board decisions had used broader language to define union
conduct barred by Section 8(b)(4) and that the Board had found a
violation of Section 8(b)(4) when union agents had been stationary and
there was "no patrolling or other ambulation., 17' The majority
distinguished those cases on the grounds that they preceded the Supreme
Court's DeBartolo decision and/or stationary conduct was found illegal
only after it followed "patrolling" conduct.17 1
The majority next turned to the General Counsel's "signal
picketing" argument.1 72 After observing that there was no evidence
indicating the banners were intended to or did "signal" any
employees, 173 the majority made the more general point that the General
Counsel's defimition of "signal picketing" was overbroad. 174 The
majority characterized the General Counsel's interpretation of "signal
picketing" as "includ[ing] all activity conveying a 'do not patronize'
message directed at the public simply because the message might reach,
and send a signal to, unionized employees., 175 The majority found that

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
See id. at 797, 801.
Id. at 802.
See supra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
See Eliason & Knuth ofAriz., 355 N.L.R.B. at 803-04.
Id. at 804.
See id. at 804-05.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 805.
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this interpretation was in conflict "with DeBartolo, Tree Fruits, and
many other prior decisions. ' 176 As was discussed earlier in this Part, in
both DeBartolo and Tree Fruits, the Supreme Court found to be lawful
message (in whole or
union conduct that conveyed a "do not patronize"
177
in part) that was also visible to employees.
The majority's next criticism of the General Counsel's broad
definition of signal picketing relates to points made later in this Article
in Part V. The majority denounced as unrealistic the General Counsel's
implicit assumption that banners operated "as a signal automatically
' 178
The
obeyed by union members" rather than as "ordinary speech.
majority declared: "Our experience with labor relations in the early
twenty-first century does not suggest such a categorical assumption is
warranted. '179 Part V will discuss why this assertion by the Eliason &
Knuth ofArizona majority is well-justified.18 °
As discussed earlier, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance was
key to the majority's conclusion that the union's bannering was
lawful. 81 Consequently, a crucial part of the two dissenters' opinion was
their explanation why no First Amendment issue would be raised by
182
concluding, as they did, that the bannering violated Section 8(b)(4).
The dissent's basis for distinguishing the handbilling in DeBartolo was
that the bannering was more like traditional picketing that had been
found unprotected by the First Amendment, at least in part because the
"expressive element" of the "brief' message on a union banner "is less
than the expressive element in picket signs ... and it is certainly less
than in handbills." '83 The dissent also found that, like traditional
picketing, the display of banners would evoke an "automatic response,"
but from the public and consumers, not employees. 8 4 Having
asserted that bannering was more comparable to traditional picketing
than handbilling, the dissent relied on U.S. Supreme Court
precedents that upheld, or referred to, Section 8(b)(4) restrictions to
support their position that no constitutional issue was raised by
prohibiting bannering. 85

176.
177.
178.

Id.
See supra notes 36-48, 71-83 and accompanying text.
See Eliason & Knuth ofAriz., 355 N.L.R.B. at 805.

179.

Id.

180.
181.

See infra Part V.
Eliason &Knuth ofAriz., 355 N.L.R.B. at 810-11.

182.
183.
184.

Id. at 820-21 (Schaumber & Hayes, Members, dissenting).
Id. at 821.
Id. at 815 & n.24.

185.

Id. at 815-16, 820-21.
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In several subsequent decisions during President Obama's
administration, the majority in NLRB decisions relied on Eliason &
Knuth of Arizona to find that union bannering was lawful, while one or
more dissenting Board Members relied on the dissent of Members
Schaumber and Hayes in the same decision as their reason for
concluding such conduct was illegal.186 Moreover, in Sheet Metal
Workers Local 15,187 nearly the same majority as in Eliason & Knuth of
Arizona relied on their reasoning in that decision to find that a union's
display of a large inflated rat near the entrance of a secondary employer
was not unlawful under Section 8(b)(4), with Member Hayes dissenting
for the same reasons as in his joint dissent with Member Schaumber in
Eliason & Knuth of Arizona' 8 8 In Laborers' InternationalUnion, Local
872 (Westgate Las Vegas Resort & Casino),8 9 the Board relied on both
Eliason & Knuth of Arizona and Sheet Metal Workers Local 15 in
holding that the union did not violate Section 8(b)(4) by displaying
banners and various inflated animals (rat, cockroach, pig, and cat) near
the secondary hotel and casino. 190
The most recent development is a pending petition by the NLRB
General Counsel for an injunction against a union for posting an
inflatable rat outside a construction site. 1 9' The petitioner is Regional

186. See, e.g., Sw. Reg'l Council of Carpenters, Local 184 (New Star), 356 N.L.R.B. 613, 61416, 618 (2011); New Star, 356 N.L.R.B. at 618-19 (Hayes, Member, dissenting); Mid-Ati. Reg'l
Council of Carpenters (Starkey Construction), 356 N.L.R.B. 61, 61 (2010); Starkey Construction,
356 N.L.R.B. at 62 (Hayes, Member, dissenting); Sw. Reg'l Council of Carpenters, Local 1506
(Held PropertiesI), 356 N.L.R.B. 42, 42 (2010); Held PropertiesII, 356 N.L.R.B. at 42 (Hayes,
Member, dissenting); Sw. Reg'l Council of Carpenters, Local Union No. 1506 (Held Properties1),
356 N.L.R.B. 21, 21-22 (2010); Held Properties1, 356 N.L.R.B. at 22 (Hayes, Member, dissenting);
Sw. Reg'l Council of Carpenters (Richie's Installations), 355 N.L.R.B. 1445, 1445-46 (2010);
Richie's Installations, 355 N.L.R.B. at 1446 (Hayes, Member, dissenting); Carpenters Local Union
No. 1506 (Marriott Warner Center Woodland Hills), 355 N.L.R.B. 1330, 1330-31 (2010); Marriott
Warner Center Woodland Hills, 355 N.L.R.B. at 1331 (Hayes, Member, dissenting); Sw. Reg'l
Council of Carpenters, Local No. 209 (Carignan Construction),355 N.L.R.B. 1301, 1301 (2010);
Carignan Construction, 355 N.L.R.B. at 1301 (Hayes, Member, dissenting); United Bhd. of
Carpenters, Local Union No. 1506 (AGC), 355 N.L.R.B. 1137, 1137, 1138-39 (2010) (noting this
case is the "companion case" to Eliason & Knuth ofArizona); AGC, 355 N.L.R.B. at 1139 (Hayes,
Member, dissenting); United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 184 (Grayhawk Development), 355
N.L.R.B. 1117, 1117 (2010); Grayhawk Development, 355 N.L.R.B. at 1117 (Hayes, Member,
dissenting).
187. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 15,356 N.L.R.B. 1290 (2011).
188. Id. at 1290, 1291-94; id. at 1295-97 (Hayes, Member, dissenting); see also Eliason &
Knuth ofAriz., 355 N.L.R.B. at 816 (Schaumber & Hayes, Members, dissenting).
189. 363 N.L.R.B. No. 168 (Apr. 19, 2016).
190. Id. at *1 & n.2.
191. Petition for Preliminary Injunction Under Section 10(1) of the National Labor Relations
Act at 5-6, Ohr v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO, No. 1:18-cv-08414 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 21, 2018) [hereinafter Petition for Preliminary Injunction].
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19 2 but the
Director Peter Sung Ohr of the NLRB's Thirteenth Region,
request for injunction was authorized by the NLRB's current General
Counsel Peter Robb.' 93 General Counsel Robb, in apparent disregard not
only of past decisions by the NLRB with a majority appointed by
President Obama, 94 but of a First Amendment decision by the Sixth
Circuit,1 95 is thus asking a court to find that a union's use of an inflatable
rat in its protest likely violates Section 8 (b)(4)(i)(B), (ii)(b), and (7)(C)
19 6 In authorizing this
of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").
action, General Counsel Robb is seeking a return to the legal view of his
197 views that even a
predecessor General Counsel Arthur Rosenfeld,
Republican-majority NLRB reserved on adopting in 2006.198
The decisions on bannering and inflatables do not mean that unions
have carte blanche in directing protests at secondary employers as long
as they avoid traditional picketing. Neither the Board nor any court has
ever taken issue with the D.C. Circuit's holding in Warshawsky & Co. v.
NLRB, 199 discussed earlier in this Part, that union non-picketing protest
conduct (in that case, handbilling) intended to cause, and/or with the
effect of causing, employees of secondary employers to refrain from
°°
working was prohibited by Section 8(b)(4)(i). In fact, in the first of the
2 1 Southwest
bannering decisions of the "President Obama Board,"
Regional Council of Carpenters, Local 184 (New Star), the Board
majority found it necessary to distinguish Warshawsky, which the
majority found to be heavily relied on by Member Hayes in his
dissent." 2 The New Star majority pointed out that, unlike the timing of
the union's handbilling in Warshawsky, the unions "did not time the
display of the banners to coincide with secondary employees' reporting
times" and, also unlike in Warshawsky, there was no evidence that "any
secondary employees actually ceased work at any time or in any
192. Id.at 1.
193. Hassan A. Kanu, Death to Scabby: Trump Labor Counsel Wants Protest Icon Deflated,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 22, 2019, 5:54 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/death-toscabby-trump-labor-counsel-wants-protest-icon-deflated.
194. See generally Westgate Las Vegas Resort & Casino, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 168 (Apr. 19,
2016); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 15, 356 N.L.R.B. 1290 (2011).
195. Tucker v. City of Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457, 462-64 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a union's
use of an inflatable rat to protest was protected by the First Amendment); see also infra note 515.
196. See Petition for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 191, at 1.
197. See Press Release, supra note 103. These legal views of former General Counsel
Rosenfeld were discussed earlier in this Article. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
198. The Ranches at Mt. Sinai, 346 N.L.R.B. 1251, 1251-52 (2006).
199. 182 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
200. Id. at 953-56; see supra text accompanying notes 82-102.
201. The lead decision of the "President Obama Board" was discussed earlier. See supra note
155 and accompanying text.
202. New Star, 356 N.L.R.B. 613,616-18 (2011).
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manner."2 3 Based on these and other differences in facts between New
Star and Warshawsky, the New Star majority decided "we cannot find
that the secondary employees would reasonably have understood that the
Unions were asking them, through the display of the banners, to stop
work for their employers." 2" The Board majority's taking pains to
distinguish Warshawsky in these ways implied that in a case in which a
banner or other non-picketing protest conduct did cause one or more
secondary employees to refrain from performing work, they might find
that conduct to have violated Section 8(b)(4).
As mentioned earlier in the preceding paragraph regarding this New
Star decision, Member Hayes in dissent relied on Warshawsky (and
other court and Board decisions) to conclude that the union's bannering
was unlawful because he found that conduct was "coercive" and targeted
employees of secondary employers, which was sufficient to find it
illegal under Section 8(b)(4) even if the union did not succeed in causing
205
any employees to stop working.
HI. How THE LINE CAME TO BE: DEVELOPMENT OF SIGNAL PICKETING
As discussed in Part II, the NLRB's General Counsel, some NLRB
ALJs, and some courts have used the doctrine of "signal picketing" in
drawing the line between speech and expressive communication, which
are protected by the First Amendment, and conduct, which is not.2 °6 This
speech/conduct distinction, however, was not the issue for which the
NLRB and courts developed the doctrine of "signal picketing" in the
1950s. The NLRB and courts developed the concept of signal picketing,
and its opposite "publicity" picketing, as a means of differentiating
between union intentions for engaging in ambulatory picketing.
Determining the intent of the union was necessary in interpreting Section
8(b)(4), the first federal statute to restrict union picketing and other
persuasive activity, because that provision prohibited such conduct only
where the union's "object" was at least one of four goals. 2°7
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
(b)

Id. at 617.
Id.
See id. at 618-21 (Hayes, Member, dissenting).
See supra Part II.
Until it was amended in 1959, Section 8(b)(4) read as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to
engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object
thereof is:
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The development of the "signal picketing" concept began in 1949,
within two years after Section 8(b)(4) went into effect, with the NLRB's
°8
decision in Denver Building Trades, a case that ultimately went to the
U.S. Supreme Court.2 °9 In Denver Building Trades, the Board adopted
the Intermediate Report of Trial Examiner Earl S. Bellman, and
specifically adopted the Trial Examiner's findings and conclusions that
the unions' picketing of unionized contractor Doose & Lintner's
Bannock Street project violated Section 8(b)(4)(A) because that
picketing had the unlawful objective of "forcing Doose & Lintner
to cease doing business with [non-union subcontractor] Gould
& Preisner. "210
Trial Examiner Bellman began his analysis of the Bannock Street
project picketing by quoting Articles I-B and XI-B of the Bylaws of the
211 one of the
Denver Building and Construction Trades Council,
respondent labor organizations in the case. Trial Examiner Bellman then
stated: "Manifestly the action with respect to picketing Doose &
Lintner... was taken pursuant to the above provisions of the Council's
bylaws. 212 Trial Examiner Bellman found that the Council decided to

(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any
labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease
using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of
any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business
with any other person;
(B) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a
labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor
organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under
the provisions of section 9;
(C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a
particular labor organization as the representative of his employees if another
labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees
under the provisions of section 9;
(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees
in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather
than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or
class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification
of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees
performing such work ....
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 8(b)(4), 61 Stat. 136, 141-42 (1947).
208. In re Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Denver Building Trades), 82 N.L.R.B.
1195 app. at 1216 (1949).
209. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
210. See Denver Building Trades, 82 N.L.R.B. at 1195-96.
211. Seeid. app. at 1214-15.
212. Id.app. at 1215.
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engage in a "joint strike action" with its affiliated unions, pursuant to
Bylaw Article XI-B, Section 1, which provided:
Strikes must be called by the Council or the Board of Agents in
conformity with Article I-B, Sections 1-2. When strikes are called the
Council shall have full jurisdiction over the same, and any contractor,
who works on a struck job, or employs non-union men to work on a
struck job, shall be declared unfair and all union men shall be called
213
off from his work or shop.
Trial Examiner Bellman then tied the Council's strike decision to
the picketing by reasoning that the signs held by the picketers, which
stated that "the Bannock Street project was unfair to the Council[,]
constituted a clear signal, in the nature of an order, to the members of
the respondent unions ... to withhold their services for the duration of

the picketing. 21 4 Trial Examiner Bellman therefore concluded that the
picketing was "an integral and inseparable part" of the "strike action. '2 15
Trial Examiner Bellman reinforced his conclusion by pointing out that
"as soon as the illegal objective of the Respondents' strike action [i.e.,
the removal of the non-union subcontractor from the project] had been
achieved, the picket, the signal to union workmen that a strike was in
progress, was removed. Thereupon union workmen were again available
to Doose & Lintner. 21 6 Later in his decision, Trial Examiner Bellman
repeated: "This picketing was the signal, far clearer than any wink or
nod, whereby the Respondents ordered their members to refrain from
2 17
work for the duration of such signal.,
Thus, the picketing in Denver Building Trades was found illegal
because it was a "signal, in the nature of an order" by the unions to their
members that they must strike.218 Trial Examiner Bellman emphasized
that if the picketing or other union expression had not constituted an
213. Id. Trial Examiner Bellman also quoted Article I-B, Sections 1 and 2, the provisions
referenced in Article X-B, Section 1. Those provisions stated:
Section 1. It shall be the duty of this Council to stand for absolute closed shop conditions
on all jobs in the City of Denver and jurisdictional surroundings. Notifications shall be
given to all contractors to protect themselves in their contracts with the usual union labor
clauses, so that they will be protected on materials in case of strike.
Section 2. The Board of Business Agents, by majority vote at any regular meeting, shall
have the power to declare a job unfair and remove all men from the job. They shall also
have the power to place the men back on the job when satisfactory arrangements have
been made.
Id. app. at 1214-15.
214. See id. app. at 1216 (emphasis added).
215. Id.
216. Id. (emphasis added).
217. Id. (emphasis added).
218. Id. app. at 1216-17.
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order to strike, he would not have found it illegal, stating near the end of
his decision that
nothing in this report is intended to foreclose the Respondents from
utilizing any type of publicity as to the nature of any labor dispute, so
long as the form and method of such publication is distinguishable
from, and does not incorporate within it, anything which, realistically
members to take strike
interpreted, is tantamount to an order to their
219
action for any purpose repugnant to the Act.

22 °
When Denver Building Trades reached the U.S. Supreme Court,
the Court agreed with the findings of the NLRB and Trial Examiner
Bellman that the unions' picketing was tantamount to an order to
strike.22 1 Using language similar to Trial Examiner Bellman's, the Court
stated that the Council's notice that it would picket the project as
"unfair" was "a signal in the nature of an order to the members of the
affiliated unions to leave the job and remain away until otherwise
ordered., 222 Later in its decision, in rejecting the argument that
Section 8(c) of the NLRA protected the unions' activity, the Court
expressly relied on Trial Examiner Bellman's reasoning that the unions'
picketing was an order to strike:

Section 8 (c) does not apply to a mere signal by a labor organization to
its members, or to the members of its affiliates, to engage in an unfair
labor practice such as a strike proscribed by § 8 (b) (4) (A). That the
placard was merely such a signal, tantamount to a direction to strike,
was found by the Board. ". .. [T]he issues in this case turn upon acts

by labor organizations which are tantamount to directions and
instructions to their members to engage in strike action. The protection
afforded by Section 8 (c) of the Act to the expression of 'any views,
argument or opinion' does not pertain where, as here, the issues raised
under Section 8 (b) (4) (A)223turn on official directions or instructionsto
a union's own members."
It is also worth noting that throughout the Denver Building Trades
the Supreme Court referred to the unions' actions as
decision, 224
a "strike.

219. Id. app. at 1217.
220. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
221. Id.at 687-92.
222. See id. at 678-79 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court also quoted the same provisions
of the Council's Bylaws as Trial Examiner Bellman had in his report. See id. at 678-79 n.3.
223. See id. at 690-91 (emphases added) (quoting Denver Building Trades, 82 N.L.R.B. at
1213).
224. See, e.g., id. at 677 (announcing at the outset of the decision that the "principal question"
in the case was whether the unions, "by engaging in a strike," had violated Section 8(b)(4)(A)); id
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The NLRB continued to develop the concept of signal picketing in
its 1956 decision in Local 50, Bakery and Confectionery Workers
International Union (Arnold Bakers),2 25 where it again found that the
union's picketing was a signal for a strike.2 26 Near the beginning of its
Arnold Bakers decision, the Board announced there were
"two crucial questions" in determining whether the union's picketing
violated Section 8(b)(4): "[(1)] Was 'an object' of Respondent Local
50 to force or require Arnold to recognize and bargain with Local 50
rather than the duly certified Arnold Bakers Employees
Association? (2) Did Local 50's picketing activities at Arnold's
plant... constitute inducement and encouragement of employees to
engage in a strike... ?,227
Some factors complicating the Board's task in Arnold Bakers were that
Local 50's picket signs never asked employees to stop working, and in
the period for which the union's picketing was alleged to be illegal, the
signs were directed at consumers and not employees.22 8
Regarding the first question, of the union's objective, the Board
found that the language on the picket signs was "insufficient" evidence
that the objectives of the union's picketing did not include forcing
Arnold Bakers to recognize and bargain with Local 50.229 The Board
reasoned that the union's objective could be gleaned from "the type of
pressure brought to bear on the employer and the consequences to be
anticipated therefrom."2 3 In Arnold Bakers, of course, the "type of
at 685 ("Th[e merits] require a study of the objectives of the strike and a determination whether the
strike came within the definition of an unfair labor practice stated in § 8(b)(4)(A)."); id.
at 687 ("We
must first determine whether the strike in this case had a proscribed object."); id at 689 ("It is not
necessary to find that the sole object of the strike was that of forcing the contractor to terminate the
subcontractor's contract.").

225. See 115 N.L.R.B. 1333, 1337-41 (1956).
226. Id. at 1341.
227. Id.at 1334.
228. See id.at 1334-35. The complaint against Local 50 alleged that it engaged in illegal
picketing after another labor organization won an election to become the representative of Arnold
Bakers' employees. See id. at 1334-38, app. at 1351. After the election, Local 50's agents at first
picketed without any signs, and then picketed with signs bearing the following message:
PLEASE DO NOT BUY ARNOLD'S PRODUCTS ARNOLD'S EMPLOYEES HAVE
REFUSED TO JOIN LOCAL 50 OF THE BAKERY AND CONFECTIONERY
WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION AFFILIATED WITH THE AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF LABOR THE WORKING CONDITIONS AT ARNOLD'S ARE
BELOW LOCAL 50 STANDARDS IN OTHER BAKING COMPANIES PLEASE
BUY BAKERY PRODUCTS MADE BY MEMBERS OF BAKERY &
CONFECTIONERY WORKERS UNION, A. F. L.
Id. app. at 1354.
229. Id.at 1335.
230. Id.at 1337.
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pressure" was picketing.23 1 Of the picketing, the Board said: "If ... the
picket line was an inducement to employees to strike then certainly it
may reasonably be anticipated that Arnold would be under substantial
pressure to yield to Local 50's demand for recognition and that [Local
"232
50] would be aware of and have intended to apply such pressure.
The Board then turned to the second question, "whether Local 50's
picketing had the effect of inducing and encouraging employees" to
strike.233 The Board also found it necessary, in deference to "several
recent decisions" of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, to decide
whether the union intended to cause a work stoppage with its
picketing.234 The Board noted that the Second Circuit had decided that
"[a] finding of specific intent may not be necessary ... if the inducement
to cease work 'was the inevitable result or even the "natural and
235 Applying this principle, the
probable consequence" of the picketing.'
Board reasoned that the "natural and foreseeable consequence" of union
picketing was a work stoppage.236 Relying on Denver Building Trades,
the Board again described picketing as a signal to strike: "the mere
existence of a picket line is in most instances 'a strike signal' and
induces employees to assist the picketing union by refusing to work
'
regardless of the motive of the picketing union."237
The Board announced very clearly in its decision that the reason
that the union's picketing violated Section 8(b)(4) was because its effect
38 In
and probable purpose were to induce member employees to strike.
fact, the Board specifically refused to adopt "the Trial Examiner's
finding that picketing an employer's place of business is in all
circumstances inducement and encouragement of employees not to
perform employment services." 9 The Board noted that it had not found
the required illegal intent and effect of picketing in cases involving
"consumer picketing of customer entrances to stores or plants," and the
Board added that "[c]onceivably, there may be other extraordinary
circumstances in which a picket line cannot reasonably be found to

231. See id.
232. Id. (emphasis added).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Bus. Mach. & Office Appliance Mechs. Conference Bd., Local 459,
228 F.2d 553, 560 (2d Cir. 1955)).
236. Id. at 1338.
237. Id. (footnote omitted) (first citing NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341
U.S. 675, 690-91 (1951); then citing IBEWLoca1 501, 341 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1951)).
238. Id. at 1341.
239. Id. at 1340.
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induce employees to strike." 2" But usually, according to the Board,
picketing was a means to induce employees to strike:
[T]he Board has consistently held that the traditional union picket line
before employee entrances has the effect of inducing employees to
refuse to work for the picketed employer. This conclusion appeared to
the Board to have been so well established in the field of labor
relations that a specific finding of the union's actual motive in
picketing, while readily inferable in most cases, did not seem to be a
requirement under Section 8 (b) (4).241

The Board concluded that this principle that picketing is a signal to
strike overcame the facts of the specific language on Local 50's picket
signs, holding: "Nor do we believe that the wording of the picket sign in
and of itself was sufficient to dispel the normal reaction of employees,
whether obeyed or not, to the existence of this picket line before
Arnold's plant. '242 In the Board's view, the "normal reaction" of
employees to a picket line (though not the reaction of the employees in
Arnold Bakers itself 43 ) was to refuse to cross it and thus go on strike,
and so picketing is-ordinarily-an inducement to strike. 244
By 1958, the NLRB was declaring, in Seafarers' International
Union (SuperiorDerrick), "[n]o lengthy list of citations is necessary to
show that the mere appearance of a picket is frequently akin to a strike
signal. '24 5 In Superior Derrick, as in the Denver Building Trades and
Arnold Bakers decisions, the Board made its reference to picketing as a
"strike signal" in the course of discussing the intent of the union's
picketing. 24 Determining the union's intent in Superior Derrick was
complicated by a factor that the Board had also dealt with in Arnold
Bakers: the language on the union's picket sign did not indicate the
union's objective was one of those prohibited by Section 8(b)(4). 247 The
Seafarers Union's picketing was alleged to be illegal because it had led
to a work stoppage by employees of a "neutral" employer, Texla

240. Id. at 1339-40.
241. Id. (footnote omitted).
242. Id. at 1341.
243. The Board noted that "it does not appear that any employees refused to cross the picket
line." Id The Board then explained, "as the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held, the
success or failure of a picket line does not determine its legality under Section 8 (b) (4)." Id. (citing
NLRB v. Associated Musicians, Local 802, 226 F.2d 900, 904 (2d Cir. 1955)).
244. Id.
245. 122 N.L.R.B. 52, 55 (1958).
246. See id.; NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 678-79 (1951);
Arnold Bakers, 115 N.L.R.B. at 1338.
247. SuperiorDerrick, 122 N.L.R.B. at 54-56.
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Stevedoring. 248 However, the union's picket sign stated: "NO DISPUTE
WITH ANY OTHER EMPLOYER EMPLOYEES OF SUPERIOR
DERRICK CORP. ON STRIKE FOR BETTER WAGES HOURS &
CONDITIONS SEAFARERS INT. UNION AFL-CIO. 2 49 The Board
members divided over whether, given this language on the picket sign,
the intent of the union's picketing could be found illegal.2
Even though the Board majority used the strong language quoted in
the preceding paragraph, that "the appearance" of a picket is a "strike
signal," they did not, as the Board had in Arnold Bakers, find that the
union's choice of picketing as a tactic was itself sufficient evidence of
illegal intent to cause a strike.2 Instead, the Board majority relied on
other evidence of illegal intent. 2 The Board majority explained that a
few months before the challenged picketing the Seafarers Union had
engaged in picketing of Superior Derrick, with the same language on the
signs as that quoted above, that caused employees of neutral employers
to stop working. 253 The Board majority found, given what had occurred
during this earlier picketing, that during the challenged picketing
involving Texla Stevedoring, the Seafarer Union's agents "could
reasonably anticipate that [Texla's] longshoremen would not cross the
picket line, regardless of the legend on the picket signs. 2 54 The Board
majority emphasized that Texla's longshoremen were members of the
exact same unions (Locals 1418 and 1419 of the International
Longshoremen's Association) as the longshoremen who stopped work
during the earlier picketing. 25 5 Thus, the Board majority found, the
Seafarers Union
learned at Charbonnet [the site of the earlier picketing] that members
of these locals would pay no attention to the legend on the picket signs,
but rather would treat the appearance of pickets as a strike signal.
Accordingly, when the members of the same union appeared at
Dumaine [the location where Texla was operating], the [Seafarers
Union] had every reason to expect that they' would again refuse
to work.

248.

25 6

Id. at 54-55.

249. Id. at 54.
250.
251.
252.
253.

See id. at 58 (Fanning, Member, dissenting).
See id. at 55.
See id.
Id. at 53-54.

254.

Id.at 55.

255.

See id.

256.

Id.
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Even these facts indicating that it was foreseeable that picketing
would result in a work stoppage by neutral employees were not the main
bases for the Board majority's finding of illegal intent.1 7 The Board
majority linked the past effects of the Seafarer Union's picketing to the
fact that when Texla's longshoremen "asked Gould [the Seafarer
Union's agent] what the picketing was all about[,] Gould admittedly did
not reply to their questions."25 The Board majority concluded that Mr.
Gould's failure to reply was evidence of illegal intent, declaring that
"when, as here, the picketing union has been specifically apprised by
past experience that the appearance of a picket will result in secondary
employees ceasing work, it may not remain silent when directly asked
' Although the Board majority in
what is the purpose of the picketing."259
Superior Derrick found that the union's picketing was a "signal" for
employees of a neutral employer to strike,26 ° the majority's reasoning
could be interpreted as a step away from the Arnold Bakers view that the
foreseeability of a work stoppage as a response to a picket can
be sufficient evidence that the picketing was intended to cause a
work stoppage.261
The next step in the development of the doctrine of signal picketing
was not taken by the NLRB or a court, but by the United States
Congress. In 1959, for the first time, Congress added the words "picket,"
"picketed," and "picketing" to the NLRA, though Congress did not add a
definition for any of these terms.262 Congress used the term "picketing"
in a new proviso added to Section 8(b)(4) that stated that under
prescribed circumstances, union publicity other than picketing was not
-illegal even though it was directed at secondary employers. 263 The
257. See id. at 55-56 (finding the picketing union's silence pertaining to the questions from the
longshoremen troubling in light of the particular set of circumstances).
258. Id. at 55 (emphasis in original).
259. Id. at 55-56.
260. See id. at 55.
261. See Arnold Bakers, 115 N.L.R.B. 1333, 1338-41 (1956) (finding that in most
circumstances "the mere existence of a picket line" serves as a disincentive for employees to work).
262. See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L.
No. 86-257, §§ 602,704, 73 Stat. 519, 539, 544.
263. The new proviso stated:
That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph
shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a
product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has
a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does
not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the
primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or
transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer
in such distribution ....
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history of that proviso is an interesting precursor to the current
controversy over the scope of the prohibition on signal picketing. Most
of the 1959 revisions to Section 8(b)(4) originated with the House
version of the Bill, H.R. 8400,2 4 which was substituted on the floor of
the House for the bill that passed the House Education and Labor
Conmmittee. 265 Then-Senator John F. Kennedy, who presided over
the House-Senate Conference Committee on the legislation,
expressed concerns that the House bill's restrictions violated First
Amendment rights:
The prohibition [of the House bill] reaches not only picketing but
leaflets, radio broadcasts and newspaper advertisements, thereby
interfering with freedom of speech.... [O]ne of the apparent purposes
of the amendment is to prevent unions from appealing to the general
dispute. This is a basic
public as consumers for assistance in a labor
266
expression.
of
freedom
upon
infringement
To address that constitutional concern, the Conference Committee added
the "publicity proviso" to Section 8(b)(4).267 Senator Kennedy explained
the purpose of the proviso: it protected
[t]he right to appeal to consumers by methods other than picketing
asking them to refrain from buying goods made by nonunion labor and
to refrain from trading with a retailer who sells such goods.... We

were not able to persuade the House conferees to permit picketing in
front of that secondary shop, but were able to persuade them to agree
that the union shall be free to conduct informational activity
short of picketing. In other words, the union can hand out handbills
at the shop.., and can carry on all publicity short of having
ambulatorypicketing .... 268

Congress was thus well aware that its restrictions on union protests
raised constitutional issues, and that the threat of constitutional
violations was heightened when the prohibitions extended to union
expression other than traditional ambulatory picketing.

National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2012).
264. See H.R. 8400, 86th Cong. § 705(a) (1959), in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOsURE ACT OF 1959, at 680-83 (1959) (proposed

amendments to Section 8(b)(4)).
265. See Chronological Statement of Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TRE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at XI (1959).

266. See 105 CONG. REC. 16,591 (1959).
267. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4); id. § 158 amends. (1959-Subsec. (b)(4)).
268. 105 CONG. Rc. 17,898-99 (emphasis added).
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In 1959, Congress also added a new provision, Section 8(b)(7), that
restricted picketing for the purpose of organizing employees or attaining
recognition from an employer.26 9 During Congress's discussions of this
provision, the co-sponsor of the bill, Michigan Representative Robert
Griffin, referred to picketing as a "signal" for employees to not perform
work, stating: "The picket line is a signal for truckers not to pick up or
deliver goods to employees of maintenance contractors. "270
Representative Griffin did not say anything further about what he meant
by signal, and no other member of Congress used the term during the
discussion of the legislation.271 However, a possible clue to Congress's
intentions was revealed by Harvard Law Professor Archibald Cox, in a
269. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7); id § 158 amends. (1959-Subsec. (b)(7)). Section 8(b)(7)
provides:
(b)... It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed,
any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to
recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his
employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select
such labor organization as their collective bargaining representative, unless such
labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such employees:
(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with this
subchapter any other labor organization and a question concerning
representation may not appropriately be raised under section 159(c) of this
title,
(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election under section
159(c) of this title has been conducted, or
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section
159(c) of this title being filed within a reasonable period of time not to
exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing: Provided,That
when such a petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without regard
to the provisions of section 159(c)(1) of this title or the absence of a showing
of a substantial interest on the part of the labor organization, direct an
election in such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify the
results thereof: Providedfurther, That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall
be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of
truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does
not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization, unless
an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any other
person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport
any goods or not to perform any services.
Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act which would
otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this subsection.
Id. § 158(b)(7).
270. 105 CONG. REC. 14,344, 14,348 (1959) (statement of Rep. Griffin) (emphasis added)
(arguing for the introduction of H.R. 8400, Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959).
271. The Author makes this assertion based on a comprehensive search through the online
legislative history of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (including the
Congressional Record and committee reports and hearings) for use of the word "signal."
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1959 speech and law review article he prepared shortly after serving as
the adviser on the legislation to its co-sponsor in the Senate, thenSenator John F. Kennedy.272
Professor Cox expressly referred to some types of picketing as
"signal picketing," which he distinguished from "publicity picketing., 27 3
Professor Cox explained the distinction in the following way:
Picketing before a union election is divided by section 8 (b) (7) into
two categories: (1) picketing which halts pick-ups or deliveries by
independent trucking concerns or the rendition of services by the
employees of other employers, and (2) picketing which appeals only to
employees in the establishment and members of the public. The
distinction is in terms of consequences rather than intent, because
motives are too difficult to disentangle. The theory is that the former
class ofpicketing is essentially a signal to organized economic action
backed by group discipline. Such economic pressure, if continued,

causes heavy loss and increases the likelihood of the employer's
coercing the employees to join the union. In the second type of
picketing, the elements of communication predominate. If the
the
employer loses patronage, it is chiefly because of the impact of274
picket's message upon members of the public acting as individuals.
Professor Cox explained that signal picketing "backed by group
discipline" should be subjected to much greater legal restriction than
publicity picketing, even if the publicity picketing affected the work
performance of some employees.275
Professor Cox's analysis in this 1959 article echoed his reasoning
in an article eight years earlier, in which he distinguished which types of
picketing were and were not protected by the Constitution.276 In the 1951
article, Professor Cox declared that "a sharp distinction between various
kinds of picketing may be drawn according to (1) the basis of its appeal

272.

See Archibald Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations

Act, 44 MINN.L. REv. 257, 257 & n.*(1959). In one of his author's notes to the article, Professor
Cox explained that "[t]he substance of this paper was delivered as a speech before the Labor Law
Section of the Minnesota State Bar Association on November 6, 1959." Id.at 257 n.*. That speech
occurred less than two months after Congress passed the amendments. See Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519, 519.
Professor Cox added in that author's note: "The author wishes to make it plain that although he has
tried to achieve a measure of academic detachment, his participation in a tense legislative struggle,
even if only as an adviser, probably left him with the shortcomings of a protagonist." Cox, supra, at
257 n.*.
273. See Cox, supranote 272, at 267 & n.41.
274. Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
275. See id.
276. See Archibald Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574, 591602 (1951).
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for support and (2) the character of the audience to which the appeal is
addressed. 2 7 7 More concretely, Professor Cox contended that a speaker
cannot claim constitutional protection "if the speaker goes beyond
'
discussion and invokes sanctions to support his words."278
Professor Cox
then explained that some union picketing involved such invocation of
sanctions: "The critical point ... is. .. the fact that the union members
respect the picket line because of a group discipline based partly on
common loyalties, partly on the force of habit, partly on fear of social
ostracism but also on severe economic sanctions."279 Professor Cox,
using actual examples, described how such sanctions operated and how
forceful they were:
The truck driver who crosses a teamsters' picket line is subject not
only to union fines but also to expulsion, and in the trucking industry
suspension or expulsion from the union may carry with it loss of
employment. In the Hollywood jurisdictional strike carpenters who
crossed a picket line established by their union were fined the
equivalent of one year's earnings. The constitutions and by-laws of
other unions provide similar sanctions and while reliable statistics are
not available, it seems plain that whenever the union is strong enough
280
to exercise its power, the power will be invoked, if necessary.
Professor Cox summarized: "The picket's reliance ... is on the
sanctions inherent in the discipline and organized economic power of
'
his union. 281
Like the court and NLRB decisions discussed earlier in this Part,282
Professor Cox used the term "signal picketing" to refer to the picketing
that was based on threat of sanction.2 83 Professor Cox distinguished this
signal picketing from "publicity picketing" and declared that "the
constitutional decisions in picketing cases should depend, in part, on
whether the 'publicity' or 'signal' aspect predominates., 284 Signal
picketing, because it relied on sanctions, was not entitled to
constitutional protection. 85
Eight years later, in his Minnesota Law Review article, Professor
Cox stressed that the distinction between "signal" and "publicity"

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id. at 593.
Id.
Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 206-61 and accompanying text.
Cox, supra note 276, at 594-95.
Id. at 595.
See id. at 593-95.
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picketing should be observed in applying the new Section 8(b)(7) limits
on picketing: "The NLRB, in administering section 8(b)(7), should
recognize that the statute draws a line between two courses of
conduct. '286 Professor Cox explained that the new statutory provisions
treated the two types of picketing very differently: "Congress placed no
limitation upon the period for which a union may engage in publicity
picketing," 28 7 while signal picketing was prohibited from lasting "for
more than a reasonable period, not to exceed 30 days" unless a petition
for an election was filed.2 88
By no later than 1962, the Dictionary of Labor Law Terms
published by Commerce Clearing House adopted the distinction between
"publicity picketing" and "signal picketing" that Professor Cox had
identified. 28 9 As quoted in a 1962 NLRB decision, the Dictionary of
Labor Law Terms's definition of picketing distinguished between these
two types of picketing: "Publicitypicketing is intended to indicate to the
public the existence of a labor dispute. It has been distinguished by the
U.S. Supreme Court from signal picketing, the intent of which is to
persuade other union members to leave their work or to refuse to enter
the premises. 2 9 °
In 1960, a year after Professor Cox's Minnesota Law Review
article, a Yale Law Journal comment by Allen H. Duffy also examined
Section 8(b)(7) and its new restrictions on picketing. 291 Like Professor
Cox's 1951 Vanderbilt Law Review article, the 1960 Yale comment
focused on the constitutional issues surrounding picketing. The comment
pointed out that a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions had found that
restriction of picketing was not unconstitutional because picketing was
"something more than free speech. 2 92 The comment stated that the
reasoning behind this conclusion was first articulated by Justice Douglas
in his concurrence in the 1942 Wohl decision, where he stated,
"Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech,... since the
very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another,
quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being
286. Cox, supra note 272, at 267. Professor Cox further admonished that "[p]roof of a few
widely separated instances of a trucker's refusal to cross a publicity picket line should not convert it
into signal picketing." Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 268.
289.

See COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, DICTIONARY OF LABOR LAW TERMS 94 (2d ed. 1953).

290. See Serv. & Maint. Emps. Union, Local 399 (Burns Detective Agency), 136 N.L.R.B. 431,
434 (1962) (quoting COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, supra note 289, at 94).
291. See Allen H. Duffy, Comment, Picketing by an Uncertified Union: The New Section
8(b)(7), 69 YALE L.J. 1393, 1395 (1960).
292. See id. at 1396-97.
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'
disseminated."2 93
According to the comment, this statement by Justice
Douglas recognized "the coercive and perhaps irrational appeal of the
picket line-an appeal stemming not from an articulation of ideas but
from 'the very presence of a picket line."' 29 4 The comment then
explained how union picketing achieved its objectives through means
other than the "articulation of ideas":

This appeal, by a process of elimination, must result from the face-toface quality of a union picket line, the conspicuous and physical
confrontation of nonpicket with picket. This confrontation invokes
convictions or emotions sympathetic with the union activity, fear of
retaliation if the picket is defied, the loyalty of nonpickets who are
union members, simple embarrassment, or other similar reactions.
Underlying all of these responses is an element of intimidation
resulting from the physical presence of the pickets or the heritage of
the union picket line tainted with bloodshed and violence. The fact that
some picket lines may rely for their effectiveness upon voluntary
observance by other unions does not necessarily diminish the
importance of confrontation. The presence of pickets will make certain
that the picket is brought to the attention of the individual member and
will ensure that the agreement not to cross is honored.295
Mr. Duffy's Yale comment thus reasoned that "confrontation" and
even "intimidation" were key features of picketing that justified the
Section 8(b)(4) and 8(b)(7) legal restrictions.29 6 Similarly, in his two
articles, Professor Cox asserted that signal picketing was based on
"sanction ' 2 97 and "group discipline. 2 98
A 1962 decision by the D.C. Circuit, authored by Judge David
Bazelon, indicated agreement with these scholars on the rationales for
restricting picketing. 299 The court explained that "picketing combines

293. Id. at 1397 (quoting Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77
(1942) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
294. Id.(footnote omitted).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1397-99. Interestingly, Mr. Duffy's Yale comment stated that "picketing" should
include such "substitutes as the distribution of circulars, the wearing of identifying apparel, or oral
announcements," as these activities would effectuate "the necessary confrontation and notification."
Id. at 1397-98. By contrast, as is discussed elsewhere in this Article (see supra notes 71-83 and
accompanying text) the U.S. Supreme Court held in DeBartolothat activities such as distribution of
circulars (called "handbills" in that case) were not regulated by the NLRA, unless they had the
intent or effect of causing employees to desist from performing work. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 578, 580, 583-84, 588 (1988).
297. See Cox, supra note 276, at 593-95.
298. See supranotes 272-85 and accompanying text.
299. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
vacated, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
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constitutionally protected speech for the purpose of communicating
ideas with a 'signal' to act which must yield to the states' power 'to set
the limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatants.' 3 00 Like
the 1960 Yale Law Journal comment, the D.C. Circuit invoked the
portion of Justice Douglas's concurrence in Wohl where Justice Douglas
stated that picketing is "more than speech" because "the very presence
of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite
irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated. 30 1
The court noted that "[t]he response to which Mr. Justice Douglas
referred is characteristic of unionized employees to whom pickets have
traditionally addressed their appeal."302 The court then invoked Professor
Cox's 1951 Vanderbilt Law Review article to explain that the unionized
employees at whom picketing was aimed "are subject to group discipline
based on common interests and loyalties, habit, fear of social ostracism,
or the application of severe economic sanctions."3. 3 In reasoning
reminiscent of Professor Cox's 1951 article, the D.C. Circuit stated that
"[i]n that context" of threat of sanction, "picketing is more than 'pure'
speech" and is not entitled to constitutional protection.3"
A corollary of this reasoning would be that picketing not
accompanied by threat of economic sanction is more akin to pure
speech, and the D.C. Circuit applied that corollary to the facts of Tree
Fruits.3 °5 The court found that in this case, the union "successfully
sought to prevent its picketing from having the customary 'signal' effect
on employees" and instead aimed its picketing at potential customers
and members of the public. 30 6 According to the court, this picketing was
not an order to a group, but an appeal to individuals: "Each prospective
patron could read the Union's signs and literature and determine,
in the light of his own interests and convictions, what course he
would follow."3 7
The D.C. Circuit did not end its analysis here; the court also
emphasized that there was no evidence in the record of economic injury
to a neutral or "secondary" employer,30 8 and made that factor a key
aspect of the legal test it applied to decide that the union's picketing was
300. Id. (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 499 (1949)).
301. Id. (quoting Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942)
(Douglas, J., concurring)); see also Duffy, supra note 291, at 1397.
302. Id.

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. (citing Cox, supra note 276, at 594).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Seeid. at 316-17.
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not illegal. 30 9 On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the D.C. Circuit's
test, 310 though the Court also concluded that the union's picketing was
legal, on the ground that the picketing was only asking consumers to
cease buying one product and was not asking consumers to stop dealing
with a secondary employer altogether.31 1 From the outset of the Supreme
Court's decision, the 312Court regarded the picketing as exclusively
"consumer picketing,,
so it did not discuss the concept of "signal
employees.
picketing" aimed at
Signal picketing and related concepts were applied by the NLRB
and courts in the early 1960s as they had to interpret the meaning of the
terms "picket" and "picketing" added to the NLRA in 1959 by the
enactment of Section 8(b)(7) and of the new proviso to
Section 8(b)(4).3 13 In interpreting the latter provision in a 1962 decision,
Burns Detective Agency,314 the NLRB considered the factor of union
discipline that had been identified as crucial by Professor Cox in his two
articles and by the D.C. Circuit in Tree Fruits.3 15 The issue before the
Board in Burns Detective Agency was whether "patrolling" by twenty to
seventy agents of the union at the main entrance to an arena, without
"placards" or "armbands" but only the distribution of some handbills,
was protected by the Section 8(b)(4) proviso. 316 The Board, reversing the
Trial Examiner's findings, found that the union's patrolling did not
violate Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) because the union "effectively took steps to
neutralize ... implied inducement and encouragement of employees" to
desist from working. 317 These steps included removal of the kind of
threat of discipline discussed by Professor Cox and the D.C. Circuit:
These steps include the failure to seek strike sanctions from the
Building Trades Council, notice to the Painters' representative that his
309. See id.at 317-18. The D.C. Circuit's test provided that "in the absence of a showing that a
substantial economic impact on the secondary employer has occurred or is likely to occur," the
NLRA does not prohibit "picketing as the form of making 'do not patronize' appeals, so long as the
picketing is conducted in an entirely peaceful and non-coercive manner, is addressed solely to
consumers, and has no side effects which might be a basis for distinguishing it from any other form
of publicity." Id.at 317.
310. See Tree Fruits,377 U.S. 58, 72-73 (1964).
311. See id. at 70-73.
312. See id at 63-64.
313. See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(b)(4), 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4),
158(b)(7) (2012); id. § 158 amends. (1959-Subsec. (b)(4)); id § 158 amends. (1959-Subsec.
(b)(7)).

314. Serv. & Maint. Emps. Union, Local 399 (Burns Detective Agency), 136 N.L.R.B. 431
(1962).
315. See id. at 437; supra notes 272-88, 305-11 and accompanying text.
316. See Burns Detective Agency, 136 N.L.R.B. at 432, 433 & n.4.
317. Id. at437.
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men could work, and notice to the Olympia Building and Maintenance
Company (which employed Respondent's members) that its employees
were free to work the show. By this conduct Respondent not only
negated any intent to cause a work stoppage but it made this known to
its members and to other unions, and the record shows that all
318
employees did carry out their assigned functions.

The Board did find that the patrolling violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
because it physically impeded access and imposed physical restraints
upon "patrons" seeking to enter the arena, and thus was "coercive to a
very substantial degree.

3 19

The union discipline issue was again important in the NLRB's 1965
decision in Lumber & Sawmill Workers Local Union No. 2797 (Stoltze
Land & Lumber),32 ° a case frequently cited over the next four decades as
authority for the prohibition on signal picketing.32 ' Interestingly, the
NLRB in Stoltze Land & Lumber concluded that handbilling by the
union amounted to signal picketing, 322 a holding that the NLRB later
acknowledged was probably overridden by the U.S. Supreme Court's
1988 DeBartolo decision,323 though that has not stopped the NLRB and
courts from relying on Stoltze for support when deciding that other
forms of conduct constitute signal picketing. 324 In Stoltze, the union
claimed that its activity on and after April 6, 1965, when it discontinued
using picket signs and instead engaged in handbilling, was not covered
318. See id. (emphasis added).
319. Seeid. at 436-37.
320. 156 N.L.R.B. 388 (1965).
321. In shepardizing the decision in July 2017, the Author found forty-eight subsequent
decisions that cited to it, including one as recent as 2016.
322. Stoltze Land & Lumber, 156 N.L.R.B. at 388, 393-95.
323. See Newark Morning Ledger Co., Case No. 22-CA-18197, 1993 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 892, at
*16-17 (Oct. 6, 1993) (concluding that because the handbilling decisions relied on by the
respondent, which include Stoltze Land & Lumber and Burns Detective Agency, "precede
DeBartolo, and therefore did not consider the constitutional implications of proscribing
handbilling[,]... much of the language of these decisions, cited by Respondent, which rely upon
the purpose of the handbilling as significant in determining that the conduct therein was tantamount
to picketing, is... superseded by DeBartolo").
324. See, e.g., Kentov ex rel. NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local 15, 418 F.3d
1259, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2005) (relying on Stoltze Land & Lumber to find that a mock funeral
procession constituted signal picketing); Serv. Emps. Union, Local 87 (Trinity Maintenance), 312
N.L.R.B. 715, 743, 754 (1993) (citing Stoltze Land & Lumber as support for finding that a
demonstration constituted signal picketing); Mid-Atl. Reg'l Council of Carpenters, JD(MD)- 16-06,
Case No. 5-CC-1289, at *15-17 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Mar. 2, 2006) (twice citing Stoltze Land
& Lumber in support of the decision that bannering constituted signal picketing), rev'd, 356
N.L.R.B. 61 (2010); U.S. Gov't Office of the Gen. Counsel, NLRB, Advice Memorandum on
Ornamental Iron Workers Local 63 Case 13-CC-2584, at 4-5, 4 nn.5-6 (Feb. 2, 2006) (relying on
Stoltze Land & Lumber in determining the display of a large inflatable rat to constitute signal
picketing).
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'
The union's
by Section 8(b)(7) because it was not "picketing."325
argument was rejected by Trial Examiner James R. Hemingway, whose
decision was adopted without comment by the Board.3 6 Trial Examiner
Hemingway pointed out that the union had expelled and otherwise
disciplined union members who returned to work for the employer being
handbilled, which he found showed that the union regarded the
handbilling as tantamount to a picket line.327 Trial Examiner Hemingway
further found that the handbilling was picketing within the meaning of
Section 8(b)(7) because it included what he determined was "[t]he
important feature of picketing," which was "the posting by a labor
organization.., of individuals at the approach to a place of business to
accomplish a purpose which advances the cause of the union, such as
keeping employees away from work or keeping customers away from
the employer's business."32' 8 Thus, because the union's handbilling on
April 6 and thereafter involved such posting, "what the Union was doing
after April 6, 1965, was just as much picketing as what it was doing
'
when it carried signs."329
The concept of "signal picketing" also grew out of 1960s decisions
in which there was little or no patrolling or movement by union agents.
In an often cited33 ° 1962 decision, Local 182, InternationalBrotherhood
of Teamsters (Woodward Motors, Inc.), 33 1 the union argued that its
action of placing signs in a snowbank next to the employer's premises
"was something other than picketing. 33 2 As its basis for agreeing with
the Trial Examiner that the "signs in the snowbank" did constitute
picketing, the NLRB stated: "These signs were watched by
Respondent's [union's] agents from a car parked on the shoulder of an
adjacent highway to make sure they were not removed or destroyed
'
In enforcing the NLRB decision, the
during the entire working day."333
Second Circuit explained that patrolling was not a required element of
picketing, but human observation of the picket "line" was required.334 In
an opinion by Judge Henry J.Friendly,33 5 the court pointed out that the

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
that cited
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Stoltze Land & Lumber, 156 N.L.R.B. at 392, 393-94.
Id. at 388, 394.
See id. at 393-94.
Id. at 394.
Id.
In shepardizing the decision in 2009, the Author found thirty-one subsequent decisions
to it, including one as recent as 2006.
135 N.L.R.B. 851 (1962).
Id. app. at 857.
Id. at 851 n.1.
See NLRB v. Local 182, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 314 F.2d 53, 56, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1963).
Id. at 56.
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dictionary definition of the noun "picket" was "a person posted by a
'
labor organization at an approach to the place of work,"336
so
"[m]ovement is thus not requisite" for union conduct to be picketing.337
The court then described picketing as being composed of "material
elements" and "human elements," and found that in this case "the Union
chose to bisect" the two by "placing the material elements in snowbanks
but protecting the human elements from the rigors of an upstate New
York winter by giving them the comfort of heated cars until a delivery
truck approached."33 The Second Circuit found that this conduct by the
union "was still 'more than speech and establishes a locus in quo that
has far more potential for inducing action or nonaction than the message
the pickets convey." 339
The following year, in its 1964 United Furniture Workers decision,
the Second Circuit had occasion to further explain the importance of the
human elements in defining picketing.3 41 The NLRB in United Furniture
Workers had adopted a Trial Examiner's opinion that, relying on Local
182, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, held that union agents
placing "On Strike" signs on trees and poles in front of the plant
constituted picketing.3 41 The Trial Examiner pointed out that after
placing the signs, the union agents "return[ed] to the parking lot across
the street from the plant where they sit in cars."34' 2 Based on these facts,
the Trial Examiner concluded that it was
a reasonable inference in this case that the union representatives in
affixing the signs with chains and locks and sitting in cars were doing
this so that the signs could be watched and protected. By their conduct
the strikers were establishing a locus in quo which was more than mere
343
speech within the meaning of the cases.
The Second Circuit denied enforcement of the NLRB's decision
against the union. 3" In an opinion by Judge Irving Kaufman (joined on
the three-judge panel by Judges Henry Friendly and Thurgood
Marshall),345 the Second Circuit acknowledged its decision the year
336.

337.
338.
339.
(1950)).
340.
341.
(1964).
342.
343.
344.
345.

Id.at 57-58 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed.)).

Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. (quoting Bldg. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537
See NLRB v. United Furniture Workers, 337 F.2d 936, 940 (2d Cir. 1964).
See United Furniture Workers (Jamestown Sterling Corp.), 146 N.L.R.B. 474, 475, 478
Id.at 478.
Id.
UnitedFurniture Workers, 337 F.2d at 939, 940.
Id. at 937.
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before in Local 182, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, that
patrolling or movement by union agents was not a required element of
picketing.146 "But," the court went on to say, "application of the term
[picketing] to activity even further from traditional picketing requires
more explanation than was here afforded. 3 47 The Second Circuit
grounded its objections to the NLRB's decision in the First Amendment,
explaining that the Board's findings "give no sufficient clue whether the
Board considered those factors which have traditionally been invoked
in distinguishing between prohibited picketing and protected
free speech."34' 8
The key factor identified by the Second Circuit was confrontation:
"one of the necessary conditions of 'picketing' is a confrontation in
some form between union members and the employees, customers, or
suppliers who are trying to enter the employer's premises. 349
Confrontation was also the factor emphasized in Allen H. Duffy's 1960
Yale Law Journalcomment,35 ° and indeed the Second Circuit expressly
quoted Duffy's passage explaining that confrontation and intimidation
were the reasons why picketing was more than the expression of an
idea.3" 5' The court then stated, "We cannot be sure that the Board
considered the extent of confrontation necessary to constitute picketing
'
The court observed that there was no
in reaching its conclusion."352
evidence on whether the union agents in parked cars were close enough
that "they could be or were seen by employees, customers, or suppliers
entering the plant," or whether those men "were reasonably identifiable
' Those facts, the court said, "would seem to
as union representatives." 353
be important in determining whether 'confrontation' was present.'354
The year after the Second Circuit's United Furniture Workers
decision, the NLRB relied on that decision in finding that the absence of
"confrontation" meant that two unions' conduct was not picketing within

346. See id at 939.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 939-40.
349. Id. at 940.
350. See Duffy, supra note 291, at 1395-98.
351. Specifically, the portion of Mr. Duffy's comment quoted by the Second Circuit was:
This confrontation invokes convictions or emotions sympathetic with the union activity,
fear of retaliation if the picket is defied, the loyalty of nonpickets who are union
members, simple embarrassment, or other similar reactions. Underlying all of these
responses is an element of intimidation resulting from the physical presence of the
pickets or the heritage of the union picket line tainted with bloodshed and violence.
United Furniture Workers, 337 F.2d at 940 (quoting Duffy, supra note 291, at 1397).
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
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the meaning of the Act.355 In its 1965 decision in Alden Press, the Board
overturned the Trial Examiner's decision that patrolling by unions at
shopping centers and public buildings with signs advertising a labor
dispute violated Section 8(b)(4) of the Act.3 56 At a crucial point in its
analysis, the Board quoted the Second Circuit: "One of the necessary
conditions of 'picketing' is a confrontation in some form between union
members and employees, customers, or suppliers who are trying to enter
the employer's premises."35' 7 Finding that no such confrontation was
present in this case,3 58 the Board concluded that the unions'
patrolling and carrying of placards could reasonably be deemed
"publicity other than picketing" for purposes of the "publicity proviso"
to Section 8(b)(4).359
Thus, in the first several years after new federal restrictions on
picketing were adopted, it was recognized in scholarship and in agency
and court decisions that what made picketing more than expression was
factors like actual physical confrontation or intimidation that created
apprehension of violence, group discipline, or other tangible
consequences. Unfortunately, this recognition seemed to fade in the
subsequent decades. One early and salient example is the 1973 case
Richman v. Teamsters,36 ° in which a federal district court judge granted
the NLRB's request for an injunction against the Teamsters "picketing"
of the Oil Products fuel oil company.361 The Teamsters, invoking the
362
Second Circuit's United Furniture Workers decision discussed above,

argued that the action of having union agents parked outside the Oil
Products gate could not be deemed illegal picketing.3 63 The judge
rejected the union's argument and found United Furniture Workers
distinguishable on the ground that in this case, unlike United Furniture
355. See Alden Press, 151 N.L.R.B. 1666, 1669 (1965).
356. Id.at 1669.
357. Id.(quoting UnitedFurniture Workers, 337 F.2d at 940).
358. Id. By way of explaining why no confrontation was present, the Board characterized the
unions' activities as "a general parading through large public areas" that "was not designed to
dissuade customers or others from patronizing the establishments in the area being paraded, nor was
it intended to halt deliveries or to cause employees to refuse to perform services, and it did not in
fact produce such results." Id. The Board further noted: "The General Counsel presented no
evidence to show, and we have no reasonable basis to infer, particularly in the light of the language
of the signs and the wording of the handbills distributed, that any of the persons in charge of the
stores or other buildings, their employees, customers, or other persons entering the buildings,
considered that these locations were in fact being picketed." Id.
359. See id.at 1668-69. For the full publicity proviso to Section 8(b)(4), see supra note 263
(quoting National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2012)).
360. 82 L.R.R.M. 3138 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
361. Id. at3141.
362. See supra notes 340-54 and accompanying text.
363. See Richman, 82 L.R.R.M. at 3138.
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Workers, "the presence of union representatives in cars outside the Oil
Products gate was known to union drivers of other trucks and had an
effect on them. ' '36 The judge thus disregarded United Furniture
Workers's extensive discussion of confrontation as a required element of
picketing and diluted that element to require only that employees be
of union agents and that such awareness has an
aware of the presence
365
apparent effect.
A few years later, in the 1977 decision District 1199, National
Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees (United Hospitals of
Newark),36 6 the NLRB itself offered only a truncated rationale for
rejecting the union's argument that its conduct was protected
expression.367 The case involved a claim that the union violated
Section 8(g) of the NLRA by picketing a health care institution without
36 8
providing written notice ten days in advance of its intention to do So.
The union contended that its conduct was "more akin to handbilling than
to picketing," but the NLRB rejected that argument because the union's
conduct involved "physical patrolling of an area," and thus would be
"treated by many as a signal which may induce them to take action,
including ceasing work. 3 69 The NLRB then invoked Justice Douglas's
assertion, from his concurrence in the 1942 Wohl decision, that
"picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it
involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a
picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective
of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated. 3 7 The NLRB's
relatively superficial dismissal of the union's argument provoked a
dissent by twenty-year Board Member Howard Jenkins, Jr.,371 who
found that "the majority's conclusion that Section 8(g) requires a per se
results in a
ban on all forms of peaceful picketing at health care facilities
3 72
constitutionally impermissible restraint on free speech.
While Richman and United Hospitals of Newark were significant
steps in redefining "signal picketing," the most influential 1970s
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
(2012)).

Id.
See id at 3138, 3141.
232 N.L.R.B. 443 (1977).
Id. at 443.
Id. at 443 & n.1 (citing National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(g), 29 U.S.C. § 158(g)

369. Id. at 443.
370. Id. at 443 & n.6 (quoting Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776
(1942) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
371. See Board Members Since 1935, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/about-us/overview/
board/board memberssince_1935.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2019) (showing that Member Jenkins
served on the NLRB from 1963 to 1983).
372. See United Hospitals of Newark, 232 N.L.R.B. at 447 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
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decision in broadening that concept and its application was a 1979
decision by the Ninth Circuit, International Association of Bridge,
Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 433 v. NLRB.3 73 The
facts in the case arose in May 1977, when the union objected to the
involvement of a particular subcontractor (R.F. Erection) in installing
elevators at the Long Beach, California arena.3 74 A couple months later,
NLRB ALJ Roger B. Holmes found that the union's picketing of the
project on May 18 violated Section 8(b)(4) because the union picketed at
multiple entrances to the construction site rather than just the entrance
"reserved" for R.F. Erection, the only employer with whom the union
had a dispute.375 On the following day, May 19, the union had restricted
its picketing to the entrance reserved for R.F. Erection, but a union
business agent and a union steward had been present at the "office gate"
and "main gate," respectively, and employees of "neutral" employers did
not report for work on the arena project that day.3 76 Based on those facts,
ALJ Holmes found that "the General Counsel persuasively argues that
both [business agent] Ward and [steward] Larken served as a 'signal' to
employees of secondary or neutral employers," and therefore the May 19
conduct of these union agents also violated Section 8(b)(4).377 After the
NLRB in November 1977 adopted ALJ Holmes's decision without
discussion,37 8 the union appealed to the Ninth Circuit contending, among
other things, that finding that its agents "engaged in signal picketing" on
May 19 "would 'expand the doctrine' because there is no precedent for
such a finding on facts such as those involved here. 37 9
The Ninth Circuit did not disagree that there were no past cases in
which "signal picketing" had been found based on similar facts, and in
fact the court acknowledged that "other cases may demonstrate that
generally it is more extreme conduct that earns the label of 'signal

373. 598 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1979). In Shepardizing this decision in 2018, the Author found
fifty-three subsequent decisions that cited to it, including four decisions in 2010 and three decisions
in 2005.
374. Id.at 1155.
375. See Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, Local No. 433 (Robert E.
McKee, Inc.), 233 N.L.R.B. 283 app. at 287, 288 (1977). ALJ Holmes's conclusion that the May 18
picketing violated Section 8(b)(4) was expressly based on rules for picketing first established in
NLRB v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council and In re Sailors' Union of the Pacific

(Moore Dry Dock Co.). See id app. at 287 (first citing 341 U.S. 675, 689 (1951); then citing 92
N.L.R.B. 547, 553, 556 (1950)). Those rules remain in effect today, but are not the primary focus of
this Article.
376. See id. app. at 287.
377. See id. app. at 287-88.
378. See id. at 283.
379. See Iron Workers Local 433, 598 F.2d at 1159.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

49

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 47:563

picketing. , 38 0 However, the Ninth Circuit declared that the assessment
of whether unlawful signal picketing occurred "is one that must be made
on a case-by-case basis, ' 38 1 and so the "only question" in this case was
"whether the Board's finding that Ward and Larken did indeed engage in
signal picketing is 'supported by substantial evidence in the record as a
whole.' 382 The Ninth Circuit concluded that there was "substantial
evidence" to support the NLRB's finding that the union agents' conduct
on May 19 constituted signal picketing that violated Section 8(b)(4).383
The Ninth Circuit explained that the NLRB had discredited the reasons
that unions agents Ward and Larken had offered for being present at the
office and main gates on May 19384 and that the record showed that these
two union agents "had spoken with various persons, including
employees of neutral employers, none of whom reported for work that
day. ' 38 5 The Ninth Circuit concluded that these facts were sufficient to
support the inference that "Ward and Larken impermissibly induced or
3 86
encouraged employees of neutral employers to stay off the job.
After Iron Workers Local 433, the doctrine of signal picketing was
no longer limited to facts involving intimidation or confrontation, but to
any situation where union protest or expression was regarded as
intending to "encourage" employees not to work. In the 1982
Construction & General Laborers Union, Local 304 decision,3 87 the
NLRB adopted without discussion a decision (but not the recommended
order) by the same ALJ who had decided Iron Workers Local 433,
Roger B. Holmes, finding that the union's placement of "signs on safety
3 88
cones and barricades and on the jobsite fence" constituted picketing.
ALJ Holmes did not cite any of the Iron Workers Local 433 decisions,
but instead relied for support on the NLRB's 1960s decisions in
Teamsters Local 182 and United Furniture Workers,389 but did so

380. See id As discussed earlier in this Part, the "more extreme conduct" that had been deemed
"signal picketing" in cases prior to Iron Workers Local 433 had usually involved intimidation or
confrontation that involved threat of physical contact and/or group discipline. See supra notes 32059 and accompanying text.
381. Iron Workers Local 433, 598 F.2d at 1159.
382. Id. (quoting Carpenters Local 470, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 1360,
1362-63 (9th Cir. 1977)).
383. See id. at 1159-60.
384. See id The union argued that Mr. Ward was at the office gate to speak to project
superintendent Page and Mr. Larken was at the main gate to report for work, and both were also at
the respective gates to keep picketers away from these neutral gates. Id. at 1160.
385. Id.
386. See id.
387. 260 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1982).
388. Id. at 1311; id app. at 1319.
389. See id. app. at 1319.
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without any mention of the element of union observation of the "picket
line" that the NLRB and Second Circuit found so important in those
cases and certainly without mention of the requirement of
"confrontation" that led the Second Circuit to deny enforcement in
United Furniture Workers.39 ° Three years after LaborersLocal 304, ALJ
Thomas E. Bracken relied on Laborers Local 304 to conclude that a
union's "bannering" constituted signal picketing. In Tamaha Local No.
1329, United Mine Workers,3 91 the NLRB adopted ALJ Bracken's
decision rejecting the union's argument that its placement of banners on
a fence post and a stake was "pure speech" and holding that while this
bannering "was to some extent speech, it was much more[; i]t was, in
fact, picketing."3'92 And in 1987, the NLRB adopted a decision by ALJ
Gerald A. Wacknov in which the ALJ relied heavily on the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Iron Workers Local 433 to conclude that
"signal picketing" could be inferred from the fact that a number of
at an entrance used by employees of
union agents had "assembl[ed]"
"neutral" employers.3 93
In the 1989 Hoffman Construction decision,394 the NLRB expressly
(albeit briefly) stated what all these decisions had implied: that signal
picketing was established whenever a union appealed to "neutral"
employees for support.395 In Hoffman Construction, the NLRB cited the
Ninth Circuit's Iron Workers Local 433 decision as authority when the
390. See id.; supra notes 331-54 and accompanying text (discussing the Teamsters Local 182
and United Furniture Workers decisions). Similarly, in Laborers International Union, Local No.
389, ALJ Joan Wieder (whose decision was adopted by the Board) relied heavily on language
adopted by the NLRB in its 1969 decision in United Mine Workers, District 12 to find that the
union's placing signs at or near entrances to a work site constituted picketing. See Laborers Int'l
Union, Local No. 389, 287 N.L.R.B. 570, 570, 573 (1987) (quoting United Mine Workers, District
12, 177 N.L.R.B. 213, 218 (1969)). ALJ Wieder emphasized the aspect of the United Mine Workers,
District 12 decision that explained that neither patrolling nor carrying of signs is a required element
of picketing, but she made no mention that this discussion occurred in the context of a union and its
agents that "emphatically and inescapably impressed upon" an employer and its employees "that
they would not be permitted to work unless and until they joined [the union] and [the employer]
signed a contract with that union," and then backed up that message by bringing 200 union agents to
the worksite to block the employer's employees from working. See id at 573 (quoting United Mine
Workers, District 12, 177 N.L.R.B. at 218); see also United Mine Workers, District 12, 177
N.L.R.B. at 218.
391. 276 N.L.R.B. 415 (1985), vacatedon other grounds, 812 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
392. Id.at 415, 431 (first citing Constr. & Gen. Laborers Union, Local 304, 260 N.L.R.B.
1311, 1319 (1982); then citing NLRB v. Local 182, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 314 F.2d 53, 58 (2d
Cir. 1963)).
393. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 12, 284 N.L.R.B. 246, 246, app. at 248-49
(1987).
394. Ironworkers Dist. Council of the Pac. Nw. (Hoffman Construction), 292 N.L.R.B. 562
(1989).
395. See id. app. at 581-82, 585.
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Board stated it agreed with the ALJ that the activity of union agents
gathered around a sign constituted illegal picketing because it "acts as a
signal to neutrals that sympathetic action on their part is desired by the
union. 3 96 By 1999, that had become the very definition of signal
picketing; in the NLRB's decision that year in The Telephone Man,
Inc.,397 the Board declared: "'Signal picketing' is the term used to
describe activity short of a true picket line that acts as a signal to neutrals
that sympathetic action on their part is desired by the union."3 98 This
broad definition of signal picketing--diluting or erasing any requirement
of confrontation, implicit threat, or intimidation-was often employed in
the 2000s decade by the NLRB's General Counsel and some
ALJs in finding activities such as bannering or display of inflatables to
be illegal picketing.3 99
Interestingly, given the seminal role of the Ninth Circuit's 1979
Iron Workers Local 433 decision in removing the requirement of
"intimidation" from the definition of "signal picketing," the Ninth
Circuit in 2018 invoked the "intimidation" caused by picketing as a basis
for holding that picketing, unlike handbilling, could be treated as
unlawful without violating the First Amendment." ° Ironically, the
charged party union defendant in this June 2018 decision was also Iron
Workers Local 433.4° 1 In the Ninth Circuit's 2018 Iron Workers Local
433 decision, the court rejected the union's argument that the
396. Id. at 562 & n.2.
397. The Telephone Man, Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 593 (1999).
398. Id. at 593 n.3 (citing Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local
No. 433 v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 1154, 1158 n.6 (9th Cir. 1979)).
399. See, e.g., Local Union No. 1827, United Bhd. of Carpenters, JD(SF)-30-03, Case No. 28CC-933, at *46-47 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges May 9, 2003), rev'd, 357 N.L.R.B. 415 (2011)
("Activity short of a traditional picket line that signals neutrals that 'sympathetic action on their part
is desired by the union' is regarded as 'signal picketing."' (first quoting The Telephone Man, Inc.,
327 N.L.R.B. at 593 n.3; then quoting Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 12, 284 N.L.R.B.
246 app. at 248 n.3 (1987))); U.S. Gov't Office of the Gen. Counsel, NLRB, Advice Memorandum
on Graphic Communications Conference, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Santa Barbara
News-Press) Cases 31-CC-2169, 31-CC-2170, 31-CC-2171, 31-CB-12427, 31-CB-12429, at 7 &
n.17 (Dec. 31, 2008); U.S. Gov't Office of the Gen. Counsel, NLRB, Advice Memorandum on
Electrical Workers IBEW Local 269 (Kay Construction, Inc.) Case 4-CC-2447, at 3 & nn.4-6 (May
3, 2006); U.S. Gov't Office of the Gen. Counsel, NLRB, Advice Memorandum on Ornamental Iron
Workers Local 63 Case 13-CC-2584, at 4-5 & nn.5-12 (Feb. 2, 2006); U.S. Gov't Office of the Gen.
Counsel, NLRB, Advice Memorandum on Carpenters Local 1144 (Cristalla, LLC) Pacific
Northwest Regional Council of Carpenters (Cristalla, LLC) Cases 19-CC-2001, 19-CC-2002, at 4-8
(Jan. 25, 2005); U.S. Gov't Office of the Gen. Counsel, NLRB, Advice Memorandum on Carpenters
Union Local 405 (Green Valley Corporation d/b/a Barry Swenson Builder), Case No. 20-CC-33661; and Hayes Mansion Conference Center, Case No. 20-CA-30124-1, at *4 (Mar. 1, 2002).
400. See NLRB v. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Ironworkers
Union, Local 433, 891 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 2018).
401. Id. at 1182.
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Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) proscription against union picketing was contentbased and therefore violative of the First Amendment under the U.S.
Supreme Court's 2015 decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert.4" 2 The Ninth
Circuit briefly summarized DeBartolo to support its point that "not all
forms of secondary protest are impermissible under [Section 8(b)(4)]."4°3
The court then found that in limiting picketing, Section 8(b)(4)
"regulates conduct rather than content," and "specifically prohibits
'threatening, coercing, or restraining any person engaged in
commerce,"' and reasoned that "[t]he First Amendment does not afford
unbridled protection to these forms of harassing and intimidating
conduct., 40 4 One or more future Ninth Circuit decisions could
reveal whether picketing and labor protest must be "harassing
and intimidating" for that court to find that it can constitutionally be
found unlawful.4 °5
IV. A PREMISE FOR THE LINE VANISHES (NEARLY): THE INCREASING
LIMITATIONS ON UNION POWER TO DISCIPLINE MEMBERS

As the late Professor Archibald Cox explained in his definitive
1950s summaries of the law on picketing, a key justification for the legal
restrictions on picketing enacted in that decade and in the 1940s was that
labor picketing was closely connected with "sanctions" and "discipline"
that a union could impose on employee/members who crossed picket
lines and performed work at a picketed establishment. 41 In the past fifty
years, however, the law has changed such that union members who
disregard labor pickets can and do easily avoid any union discipline or
economic consequence for doing so. The effective limits on union
discipline stem from a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions from the
1960s to the 1980s. As discussed earlier in Part I, Professors Pope and
Estlund have noted how these rules on union discipline arguably make
402. Id. at 1186-87 (citing Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015)).
403. Id.at 1187 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 578 (1988)).
404. See id.
405. Another possible limit on the extent to which labor protest can be constitutionally
prohibited might be suggested by a September 2017 decision by the Eighth Circuit, Wartman v.
United Food and Commercial Workers Local 653, 871 F.3d 638 (8th Cir. 2017). In that decision,
the Eighth Circuit held that "the disruption of relationships with customers and suppliers" was not
an objective covered by Section 8(b)(4) because it was no more than what "any picketed business
would suffer." Id.at 644. However, the court's decision was also based on its finding that the
union's objective in picketing was not to cause the picketed stores to "cease doing business with any
other person" because the store referenced in the picket signs was closed, and the court found the
union's objective was to get the owners of the picketed stores, who were sons of the owner of the
closed store, to persuade their father to resolve a dispute with the union. See id. at 641-44.
406. See supra notes 272-90 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Cox's articles).
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questionable the restrictions on picketing and other labor protest. 4

7

As

this Article has focused more than theirs on the centrality of union power
over members as the justification for the constitutionality of restrictions
on union protest, this Part will more fully cover the key precedents and
rules on union disciplinary power.
In its 1969 decision in Scofield v. NLRB, 4°8 the Supreme Court
interpreted Sections 7 and 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA as permitting unions
to enforce disciplinary rules against union members, but not only against
"union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule." 9
Five years after Scofield, in NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, Textile
Workers Union, Local 1029,410 the Court reversed a ruling by the U.S.

Court of Appeals that a union could lawfully fine two former union
members for crossing a picket line and returning to work during a strike
even though the employees submitted resignations from the union prior
to crossing the line and working.41 ' The Supreme Court declared that
"when a member lawfully resigns from the union, its power over him
ends., 412 These Supreme Court rulings created what Professor David

Abraham has called the "Achilles heel" of unions' power to discipline:
that the power was limited "to current union members. 4 3 Consequently,
a union member "can immunize himself from union fines [or other
'414
discipline] by resigning his union membership.
Not only is union discipline unenforceable against a member who
has resigned, the Court further held it is illegal for a union to attempt to
enforce or even threaten to enforce such discipline against a former
member. 41 ' The Court explained:

Where a member lawfully resigns from a union and thereafter engages
in conduct which the union rule proscribes, the union commits an
unfair labor practice when it seeks enforcement of fines for that
conduct. That is to say, when there is a lawful dissolution of a unionmember relation, the union has no more control over the former
4 16
member than it has over the man in the street,

407. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
408. 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
409. Id. at 428-30 (emphasis added).
410. 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
411. Id. at 214-15,217-18.
412. Id. at215.
413. See David Abraham, Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in Labor Law:
Union Membership Resignations and Strikebreaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268,
1308 (1988).
414. Harry H. Wellington, Union Fines and Workers' Rights, 85 YALE L.J. 1022, 1023 (1976).
415. See Granite State JointBoard, Textile Workers Union, Local 1029, 409 U.S. at 217-18.
416. Id. at 217 (emphasis added).
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The Court did note that under the facts of this case that "[w]e have here
no problem of construing a union's constitution or bylaws defining or
limiting the circumstances under which a member may resign from the
union,"4'17 thereby apparently reserving judgment on whether such
provisions in union governing documents could restrict when and how
union members resign.
The U.S. Supreme Court returned to and resolved that issue in 1985
in PatternMakers' League v. NLRB.41 8 In that case, the union fined ten
individuals who had violated a provision in the union's constitution that
prohibited resigning from union membership during a strike, when the
members resigned from the union during a strike and then returned to
work.419 The Court considered a ruling by the NLRB, affirmed by the
Seventh Circuit, that the union had violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
NLRA by resigning and returning to work during a strike,
notwithstanding the union's constitutional bar on resignations from
membership while the union was striking. 42° The Court's opinion by
Justice Powell was joined by the Chief Justice and three other Justices,
with Justice White filing a separate concurring opinion.42 1
In Justice Powell's opinion, after noting that because of the
NLRB's "'special competence' in the field of labor relations" the
agency's construction of the NLRA "is accorded substantial
' 2 2 he held that "§ 8(b)(1)(A) properly may be construed" by
deference,N
the NLRB as forbidding unions from fining employees for resigning
from membership even when the members resigned at a time when, or
under circumstances which, resignations are impermissible under the
union's constitution.423 Of special interest in the current decade, when
several states have enacted "right-to-work" statutes that bar union
security agreements that make payment of union dues a condition of
employment,424 a key part of the reasoning of Justice Powell's opinion
was that union limits on resignation violated the union security
provisions of Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.425 Justice Powell, relying on

417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

Id. at216.
See 473 U.S. 95, 108-10 (1985).
Id. at96.
See id. at 97-100.
Id. at96.
Id. at 100 (quoting NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975)).
See id.

424.

Josh

Eidelson,

Unions are Losing Their Decades-Long 'Right-to-Work' Fight,

AM),
6:00
2017,
16,
(Feb.
BUSiNESSWEEK
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-16/unions-are-losing-their-decades-long-rightto-work-fight.
425. See PatternMakers' League, 473 U.S. at 104-07 & nn.14-17.
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past Supreme Court decisions construing those provisions, held that they
"require employees to pay dues, but an employee cannot be discharged
for failing to abide by union rules or policies with which he
'
disagrees. "426
Justice Powell added: "Moreover, no employee can be
discharged if he initially joins a union, and subsequently resigns," and
"[b]y allowing employees to resign from a union at any time, § 8(a)(3)
protects the employee whose views come to diverge from those of his
union. '427 Based on these Section 8(a)(3) protections, Judge Powell's
opinion identified a "freedom to resign from full union membership"
that was wrongly restricted by the union's constitution's limits on
resignations during a strike.4 28
Based on the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Pattern Makers'
League,4 29 and on its own decision the year before in International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 1414
(Neufeld Porsche-Audi, Inc.),430 in which the NLRB adopted the position
approved in PatternMakers' League,43 1 the Board has consistently held
that because employees have the right to resign from the union at any
time, it is illegal for unions to discipline employees for crossing a union
picket line after so resigning. 43 2 In addition, in the current decade, NLRB
ALJs have similarly held it to be unlawful for a union to bring internal
disciplinary charges against union members who tried to resign prior to
crossing a union picket line to work for a non-union contractor.43 3
Therefore, when faced with a picket line, a union member can
avoid any penalty by resigning from membership before crossing.
Moreover, union members know or should know about their right to
resign, as unions are legally obligated to inform all members that they
can resign from the union and become nonmembers.4 34 The Board

426. See id. at 106 & n.16 (first citing Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954)
(noting that union security agreements cannot be used for "any purpose other than to compel
payment of union dues and fees"); then citing NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742
(1963) ("'Membership' as a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core.")).
427. Id. at 106.
428. Id. at 106-07.
429. 473 U.S. 95, affg 724 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1983).
430. 270N.L.R.B. 1330 (1984).
431. Id. at 1134-35.
432. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 492 (United ParcelService, Inc.), 346
N.L.R.B. 360, 363, 364 (2006); Pattern & Model Makers Ass'n (Mich. Model Mfrs.), 310 N.L.R.B.
929, 941 (1993); Bay Cities Metal Trades Council, 306 N.L.R.B. 983, 986 (1992), enforced, 15 F.3d
1088 (9th Cir. 1993); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge No. 1309
(O'Brien'sBrake Service), 289 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1287 (1988).
433. See, e.g., Chi. Reg'l Council of Carpenters, JD(NY)-23-10, No. 13-CB-193 10, slip op. at
8-10 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges July 1, 2010).
434. Teamsters Local 492, 346 N.L.R.B. at 363.
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requires "such notice, in order to be certain that [union members] have
'
voluntarily chosen union membership."4 35
If a union's governing documents do not prescribe any requirement
for resignation, then "resignation may be accomplished in any manner
sufficient to show a voluntary decision to part with union
membership"4 36 such that a member can resign "at will." And the only
requirements that unions are expressly allowed to prescribe for
resignations are that they be in writing and submitted to the union.43 7 A
written resignation will be effective as long as it clearly conveys the
person's intent to resign from union membership.43 8
Also, even when "submittal in writing" is required, that does not
necessarily mean a significant delay in effectuating a resignation; since
at least the 1970s, a written resignation is immediately effective upon
receipt when delivered to any union officer at practically any location,
including the employee's workplace. 439 Resignations submitted to the
union by any kind of mail are also effective relatively soon-by "12:01
a.m. local time on the day following the deposit in the mail ...[as]
determined by postmark."'
Currently and in the future, written

435. Id.
436. Tile, Marble, Terrazo, Finishers, Shopworkers & Granite Int'l Union, Tile Finishers,
Local 32 v. Tile, Marble, Terrazo, Helpers & Finishers Local 32, 896 F.2d 1404, 1412-13 (3d Cir.
1990).
437. See Mich. Model Mfts., 310 N.L.R.B. at 930 ("[A] a labor organization may require that,
as a condition of resignation from membership, a member provide written notification of the
member's intention to resign from the labor organization."). Since this 1993 decision, the Board has
rejected any other conditions that unions have sought to require for resignation. See, e.g., Local 58,
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers (ParamountIndus., Inc.), 365 N.L.R.B. No. 30, at *2-3 (Feb. 10, 2017)
(holding unlawful a local union's new policy requiring resignations to be submitted in writing with
photo identification at the union's hall).
438. See, e.g., Shopmen's Local Union No. 539 (Zurn Indus.), 278 N.L.R.B. 149, 152 (1986)
("There is no requirement that an employee use any magic words in order to effectively resign
membership from the union."); Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union 340 (Hulse Elec.), 273
N.L.R.B. 428, 432 (1984) ("[F]or an employee to effectively resign from membership, it is only
necessary that he 'clearly indicate that he no longer wishes to be bound by the union. "' (quoting
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 66, 262 N.L.R.B. 483 app. at 492 (1982))); Int'l Bhd.
of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 66 (Hous. Lighting & Power Co.), 262 N.L.R.B. at 486
("[Resignation] may be made in any feasible way and no particular form or method is required.");
Local 340, Int'l Bhd. of Operative Potters (Macomb Pottery Co.), 175 N.L.R.B. 756, 760 n.14
(1969) ("[E]mployees may communicate their resignations from a union in any feasible way,
and ...no particular form or method is required, so long as they clearly indicate to it that they no
longer wish to remain members of it.").
439. See, e.g., United Constr. Workers, Local 10, Christian Labor Ass'n (ErhardtConstr. Co.),
187 N.L.R.B. 762, 762-63 (1971); see also Mich. Model Mfrs., 310 N.L.R.B. at 930 ("When the
member personally serves an agent of the labor organization, including the business agent at the
member's work place, as well as at the union hall, with a notification of resignation, the resignation
shall be effective upon receipt.").
440. Mich. Model Mfrs., 310 N.L.R.B at 930.
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resignations can be submitted even faster, as by e-mail and by texting
from one device to another. Although there are not yet any published
determinations on the effectiveness of such "e-resignations," it seems
likely that the NLRB will permit them and give them immediate effect,
given how in the Michigan Model Manufacturersdecision (in which the
Board established the rules just discussed on when resignations will be
effective), the Board declared that rules on membership resignations
unionism noted by
should "reflect the congressional policy of voluntary
44 1
the Supreme Court in PatternMakers['] League."
All of this means that every union member has virtually complete
freedom of choice when deciding whether to cross a picket line. Unlike
when the limits on union protest were enacted in the 1940s and 1950s,
unions cannot "direct" or "induce" a member to refrain from working for
a targeted employer on pain of financial penalty if the member defies the
union. 442 The member can resign from the union and work for that
employer, and the union cannot penalize them financially or affect their
employment, and the union may still be obligated by law to fully and
fairly represent that former member. The statutory restrictions were
imposed, and upheld, in a time when unions could economically
force member-employees to refrain from working for an employer.
That time is over.
V. THE LINE MUST BE MOVED FOR FEDERAL LIMITS
ON LABOR PROTEST TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL

A. The Rationalesfor Upholding the CurrentLine are Unsustainable
1. The Key "Inducement" Not "Persuasion" Rationale
No Longer Applies
Judges and other commentators on the constitutionality of the
statutory restrictions on labor picketing have observed, especially in
periods closer in time to the actual enactment of those restrictions, that
they did not violate the First Amendment because they applied to union
conduct with the intent (and often effect) of causing employees to act
based on "inducement" and "sanction," rather than on union persuasion
and expression of ideas." 3 For the reasons discussed in immediately
441. See id
442. See supra notes 207-88 and accompanying text.
443. See, e.g., supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text (discussing Wohl, 315 U.S. 769
(1942) (Douglas, J., concurring)); supra notes 299-309 and accompanying text (discussing Tree
Fruits, 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962)); supra notes 340-54 and accompanying text (discussing
United Furniture Workers, 337 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1964)); supra notes 355-65 and accompanying
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preceding Part IV, 4' the ability of unions to engage in such
"inducement" or to impose such "sanction" is, in practice, wholly or
nearly eliminated. After an employee resigns as a member of the union,
the union cannot discipline that employee for crossing a picket line or
otherwise working for an employer against the union's wishes. And, as
of the publication of this Article, the only conditions a union can require
for a member's resignation to be effective is that it be in writing and
received by the union, conditions that with this century's technology of
instant messaging and just as "instant" (or nearly so) texting, e-mailing,
etc., are conditions that virtually any union member-employee can
satisfy as soon as they wish.
In NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Union,
Local 1029," discussed in Part IV of the Article," 6 the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that after an employee member resigns from their union,
"the union has no more control over the former member than it has over
the man in the street." 7 The distance is close between a man (or person)
in the street and a customer leaving "the street" (or parking lot or
sidewalk) to patronize a retail or other enterprise." 8 With regard to such
customers, the Supreme Court stated in DeBartolo that "[t]he loss of
customers because they read a handbill urging them not to patronize a
business, and not because they are intimidated by a line of picketers, is
the result of mere persuasion, and the neutral who reacts is doing no
more than what its customers honestly want it to do." 9 In practical
terms, unions can no longer "intimidate" with any sanction any member
employee who resigns from the union (or, perhaps, even informs the
union they will do so if sanctioned for what they want to do). Currently
such employees have the same or nearly the same freedom from
coercion as customers in deciding whether to go ahead and engage with
the union protesters' target. This is true when the employees work
directly for the targeted employer, and perhaps even more true when the
employees work for a supplier, purchaser, or other enterprise seeking to
transact with the targeted employer.
Consequently, when union agents are handbilling, bannering, or
picketing or protesting in any way at a targeted employer, then-as long
as persons seeking to engage with that employer are not physically
text (discussing Alden Press, 151 N.L.R.B. 1666 (1951)).
444. See supra Part IV.
445. 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
446. See supranotes 410-12 and accompanying text.
447. GraniteState JointBoard, Textile Workers Union, Local 1029, 409 U.S. at 217.
448. Cf Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 570-71, 574 (1988) (describing the handbilling process at issue).
449. Id. at 580.
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blocked from or threatened against doing so-the union agents, like the
handbillers in DeBartolo, are relying on nothing more than "mere
persuasion" with regard to employees subject to their message, just as
these union agents are seeking to persuade customers.
This equivalence has sometimes been recognized in court and
Board decisions. In 1965 in Stoltze Land & Lumber Co., discussed
previously in Part 111,450 the Board did equate appeals to consumers and
appeals to employees:
The important feature of picketing appears to be the posting by a labor
organization... of individuals at the approach to a place of business to
accomplish a purpose which advances the cause of the union, such as
keeping employees away451from work or keeping customers away from
the employer's business.

The Stoltze Land & Lumber Board might well have been correct all
along in treating union appeals to customers and appeals to employees
the same, while mistaken in regarding both as unlawful.4 52
When unions could impose concrete monetary fines and other
tangibly adverse consequences to discipline member employees who
crossed picket lines, or who disregarded handbills, banners, or other
messages seeking employees to refrain from performing work for an
employer, those consequences could perhaps have justified the treatment
of union appeals to member employees as "inducements" that involved
more than "persuasion" or "communication." However, now that unions
are practically unable to inflict such consequences on member
employees who want to work for a targeted employer, such justification
is simply inapplicable.
Among the other rationales that have been offered to justify labor
protest directed at employees as constitutionally permissible, there have
been few instances of reliance on these in the federal courts since
DeBartolo, and for good reason. In the CarpentersLocal 1506 case,453 in
which former NLRB General Counsel Arthur Rosenfeld unsuccessfully

450. See supra notes 320-29 and accompanying text.
451. Stoltze Land & Lumber, 156 N.L.R.B. 388, 394 (1965).
452. The Stoltze Land & Lumber decision preceded not only the Supreme Court's 1988
decision in DeBartolo, with which it was inconsistent in terms of union appeals to consumers, but
also preceded the line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions limiting union discipline. In fact, it was
decided during a period in which the Board's position was that any union discipline of members, as
long as it did not involve seeking employer discharge or other discipline of an employee, was
permissible under federal labor law. See, e.g., Millwrights Local 2232, 166 N.L.R.B. 849, 850-51
(1967); Local 283, United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers, 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 110104 (1964), overruledby Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
453. 409 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2005).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss2/6

60

Hayes: It's Now Persuasion, Not Coercion: Why Current Law on Labor Prote

2018]

IT'S NOWPERSUASION NOT COERCION

623

appealed454 the denial of an injunction against a banner display that the
General Counsel claimed to be "signal picketing," the Ninth Circuit did
state that true signal picketing was "more than mere speech" and
unprotected by the First Amendment because "[t]he failure of a union
member to comply could lead to formal union discipline or informal
sanctions by other union members."4'55 The court added that "'signals,'
in this context, are 'official directions or instructions to a union's own
members,' implicitly backed up by sanctions, 4 56 and that "[i]t is the
mutual understanding among union employees of the meaning of these
signals and bonds, based on either affinity or the potential for
retribution, that makes these 'signals' sufficiently coercive to fall within
the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(ii). ' ' 457 This language in CarpentersLocal 1506
was relied on by the Board majority in its 2010 Eliason & Knuth of
Arizona decision,45 8 discussed at length in Part II of this Article, 459 to
define "signal picketing" that would be deemed unlawful, unlike the
banner at issue in that case.46 °
2. (Non-Coerced) Loyalty Is an Insufficient Basis for
Restricting Labor Protest
References to "informal sanctions" and "affinity" suggest
restrictions on so-called "signal picketing" are justifiable, at least in part,
by union members' loyalty to each other. Relying on such supposed
loyalty as a basis for limiting constitutional protection is problematic for
practical and legal reasons. In finding the banners in Eliason & Knuth of
Arizona to be lawful, the Board majority astutely observed that "the
notion that the banners operated not as ordinary speech, but rather as a
signal automatically obeyed by union members must be subject to a dose
of reality," and stated: "Our experience with labor relations in the early
twenty-first century does not suggest such a categorical assumption is
warranted."4 6 ' The Board majority further noted that the record did not
show that "any union members worked for any of the secondary
employers or otherwise regularly entered the premises in the course of
their employment. 4 62 This situation is likely to be common now in the
454.

Id.at 1201 (including "Arthur F. Rosenfeld" on the list of attorneys for petitioner NLRB).

455. Id.at 1201, 1202-03, 1215 (emphasis omitted).
456. Id. at 1215 (emphasis omitted) (quoting NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 341 U.S. 675, 691 (1951)).
457.
458.

Id.
355 N.L.R.B. 797 (2010).

459. See supra notes 154-85 and accompanying text.
460. Eliason & Knuth ofAriz., 355 N.L.R.B. at 802-03, 805.
461. Id. at 805.
462. Id.
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"early 21st century" when the percentage of private sector employees
(the only type of employees covered by the NLRA) represented by a
union is currently 6.5%.463 Consequently, in labor protest situations
covered by Section 8(b)(4), it will be far more common than not that
employees of other businesses seeking to do business with the protested
"neutral" enterprise (other businesses making deliveries of supplies to,
or customer enterprises seeking to transact with, that enterprise) will not
be represented by a union. And even when labor protesters at a neutral
enterprise encounter unionized employees, it would usually require an
unpredictable coincidence for those protesters to work regularly with
employees seeking to interact with a neutral enterprise. Moreover, when
protesters are engaging in recognitional picketing under Section 8(b)(7),
then virtually by definition the employees of the targeted employer will
not be union members, and (given the low percentage of unionized
employees in the private workforce) most employees who encounter the
protesters will not be union members or represented by a union either. In
sum, as a practical matter, unions will rarely be able to rely on any
supposed "loyalty" of employees encountering their protests.
Ironically, the situations in which union protesters most likely can
rely on loyalty of fellow union members, and perhaps other employees,
have for more than sixty years been held to be outside the restrictions of
the NLRA. 464 Those would be protests against and at the working
locations of so-called "primary" employers whose employees the union
represents. Those represented employees are the ones who would usually
most likely do what protesters ask (e.g., withhold labor) out of loyalty to
the union and/or their fellow union members. Moreover, it's at locations
where a primary employer always or often works where employees of
other employers would most likely interact regularly with a primary
employer and perhaps feel some loyalty towards those employees. Yet
since the U.S. Supreme Court's 1951 decision in NLRB v. International
Rice Milling Co., labor protests appealing to employees of the primary
employer to withhold labor (e.g., during a strike) and appeals to
employees of "neutral" employers to not perform work at the primary's
work location have been held to be outside the prohibitions of
Section 8(b)(4).4 65 Thus, in the twenty-first century, justifying current
463. News Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members-2017
(Jan. 19, 2018, 10:00 AM).
464. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2012); NLRB
v. Int'l Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 670-71 (1951); Eliason & Knuth of Ariz., 355 N.L.R.B. at
805-06.
465. See Int'l Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. at 670-71. In 1959, a provison was added to Section
8(b)(4) of the NLRA that stated:
Provided,[t]hat nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to make unlawful

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss2/6

62

Hayes: It's Now Persuasion, Not Coercion: Why Current Law on Labor Prote

2018]

IT'S NOWPERSUASION, NOT COERCION

legal rules prohibiting "signal picketing" on unionized employees'
expected "loyalty" to union protesters is unrealistic and at odds with the
rules themselves.
It may be that when courts refer to "loyalty" and "affinity" in labor
protest cases, they are referring to something broader-that when labor
protesters ask employees not to perform work, those targeted workers
will conform out of loyalty to their protesting fellow workers. That view
is also problematic, as past scholars have rightly explained. For example,
Professor Julius Getman concluded in a 1984 article 466 that the Supreme
Court's labor law decisions, including its then-recent Safeco and Allied
International decisions on labor picketing, "manifest a common,
stereotyped, and paternalistic vision of workers as people whose
decisions are not made on the basis of ideas and persuasion but on the
basis of fear, coercion, and discipline. ' 467 Also in 1984, in the University
of Chicago Law Review, a comment by Ms. Barbara J. Anderson
reasonably observed:
While attention to the particular audience is crucial in determining
whether appeals to join a boycott carry with them implicit threats, a per
se rule prohibiting labor secondary boycotts that appeal not to the
public but to other union members is likely to be overbroad. A
secondary boycott that instigates a sympathy strike by the secondary
target's employees should not be presumed to be coercive. Nor should
the fact that the boycott sparks a "reflexive" rather than reasoned
response be determinative of coercion, since such 468
a response may
indicate natural empathy as easily as coerced support.
In this passage, Ms. Anderson was also reasonable in suggesting
that "empathy" by a protester's target with the aims of a protester
should not lead to that protest being deemed unworthy of First
Amendment protection.46 9
Professor Laurence Tribe made related points in his 1985 book
ConstitutionalChoices, published a year after Professor Getman's article
and Ms. Anderson's comment. 47" After quoting Justice Stevens's
a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any employer (other than his own
employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged in a strike ratified or
approved by a representative of such employees whom such employer is required to
recognize under this [Act].
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4).
466. See Getman, supra note 11.
467. Id.at 19-20.
468. Barbara J. Anderson, Comment, Secondary Boycotts and the FirstAmendment, 51 U. CI.
L. REv. 811, 830 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
469. See id.at 830.
470.

See TRIBE, supra note 11.
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concurrence in Safeco holding picketing to be unprotected because it
"calls for an automatic response to a signal, rather than a reasoned
response to an idea, ' 471 Professor Tribe determined that this reference to
"signal" did not imply "physical or economic coercion" and that "[t]he
idea appears to be, rather, that by triggering deeply held sentiments,
picketing bypasses viewers' faculties of reason and, thus, in a sense
brainwashes them into compliance with the boycott., 472 Professor Tribe
then pointed out that "this aspect of labor picketing"-appealing to
"sentiments" rather than "reason"-is also central to other forms of
expression that, under Supreme Court precedent, are protected by the
First Amendment, such as "most effective political communication. ' 473
Consequently, Professor Tribe concluded that the Supreme Court's
reasons for finding labor picketing unprotected by the First Amendment,
including that protest is a "signal" that "trigger[s] deeply held
sentiments" of fellow employees, "add[] nothing to the underlying logic
to
of the cases but does provide another superficially neutral facade
474
picketing.
labor
to
protection
of
denial
cover the Court's consistent
More than twenty-five years after Professor Tribe's Constitutional
Choices book, Professor Brishen Rogers twice referenced its points
about Justice Stevens's Safeco concurrence to comment about the
Supreme Court's apparent approach to labor protesters appealing to
other workers.4 75 In a 2010 article with a part III that, inter alia, defended
476
union emotional appeals as a basis for promoting collective action,
Professor Rogers relied on Professor Tribe's characterization of Justice
Stevens's concurrence (which is quoted in the preceding paragraph of
this Article) to support the view that "judges in labor law cases... often
seem to fear unruly behavior by workers. 477 Two years later, Professor
Rogers again relied on the ConstitutionalChoices's comments on Justice
Stevens's concurrence,47 8 this time to support Professor Rogers's
assertion: "While outright bans on labor picketing are unconstitutional,
471. Id. at 200 (quoting Safeco, 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)). This
Safeco decision (and Justice Stevens's concurrence in it) are discussed earlier in this Article. See
supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
472. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 200.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. See Brishen Rogers, "Acting Like a Union": Protecting Workers' Free Choice by
Promoting Workers' Collective Action, HARV. L. REV. F., Jan. 2010, at 50 & nn.74-75.
476. See id. at 45-51.
477. Id. at 50 (quoting TRIBE, supra note 11, at 200 ("[B]y triggering deeply held sentiments,
picketing bypasses viewers' faculties of reason and, thus, in a sense brainwashes them into
compliance with the boycott.")).
478. See Brishen Rogers, Passion and Reason in Labor Law, 47 HARV. CR-CL L. REV. 313,
330 & n.83 (2012).
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the Supreme Court has granted less First Amendment protection to labor
picketing than to virtually identical picketing by civil rights and other
organizations, seemingly on the grounds that workers are emotionally or
psychologically incapable of crossing a picket line." 79 Further on in the
article, Professor Rogers explained how such grounds are likely
misplaced, based on extensive scholarship showing that emotional
reactions are not inconsistent with, and in many areas of law are not
treated as inconsistent with, reasonable decision-making.48 °
Also, for Section 8(b)(4), when protest is directed at a secondary,
neutral employer, employees of that employer-virtually by definition
of "secondary"-are not co-workers of the protesters. If employees are
loyal to employees, is it unfair to infer that employers are loyal to
employers? And if that's so, then there would be no such thing as
employers who are "neutral" in a labor dispute between another
employer and its employees, which is the purpose of Section 8(b)(4)
restrictions in the first place. 481 For all these reasons it's clear that
union member or employee "loyalty" is at best a questionable and
slippery justification.
3. A "Deference to Policy Balance" Rationale
Is Vague and Outdated
Another rationale offered for upholding federal restrictions on labor
protest is that, as Justice Blackmun phrased it in his concurrence in
Safeco, finding otherwise would "hold unconstitutional Congress'
striking of the delicate balance between union freedom of expression and
the ability of neutral employers, employees, and consumers to remain
free from coerced participation in industrial strife. 4 82 Two years after
Safeco, in Allied International,the Court in a majority opinion by Justice
Powell, expressly relied on Justice Blackmun's "balance struck by
Congress" rationale as the only ground, other than citing the Court's past
precedents on Section 8(b)(4), for holding that Section 8(b)(4) did not
violate the First Amendment and thus could be constitutionally used to
find unlawful the union's political boycott activity of refusing to perform
work for ships bound to or from the then-Soviet Union.48 3 The Court
declared, "[t]he labor laws reflect a careful balancing of interests," and
479. Id. at 328-29.
480. Id. at 359-61.
481. See, e.g., Safeco, 447 U.S. 607, 613-14 (1980) ("[A]n expansion of labor discord was one
of the evils that Congress intended § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to prevent."); Am. Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S
Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 236 (1974) ("[Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is] designed to shield neutral third parties
from the adverse impact of labor disputes.").
482. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 617-18 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
483. See Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 226-27 (1982).
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then cited to Justice Blackmun's Safeco concurrence.484 In the next
sentence, the final one of the Court's decision, the Court added: "There
are many ways in which a union and its individual members may express
their opposition to Russian foreign policy without infringing upon the
485
rights of others.
Deference to legislative policy might also have been the basis for
the Allied International Court's choice of past Supreme Court
precedents to cite for its declaration: "We have consistently rejected the
claim that secondary picketing by labor unions in violation of § 8(b)(4)
is protected activity under the First Amendment., 486 In support of that
statement the Court cited, in addition to Safeco,487 the page of Tree
Fruits in which that decision referenced legislative history and the type
of conduct Congress sought to prohibit, 488 and also cited American
Radio Association4 89 and IBEW Local 501.490
In footnote 25, the Allied InternationalCourt quoted a statement
from IBEWLocal 501 referring to state and Congressional policy: "[W]e
recently have recognized the constitutional right of states to proscribe
picketing in furtherance of comparably unlawful objectives. There is no
reason why Congress may not do likewise. '49 1 The American Radio
Association decision cited in Allied Internationalwas similarly one that
relied on deference to other policymakers, in that case an Alabama tort
law policy against wrongful interference with business.4 92 The Court in
American Radio Association stated that the free speech challenge to the
injunction based on this policy was "foreclosed by our holding in
Vogt. '49 3 American Radio Association noted that the Court's 1957 ruling
484. Id. (citing Safeco, 447 U.S. at 617-18 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
485. Id. at 227.
486. Id. at 226.
487. Id. (citing Safeco, 447 U.S. at 616).
488. Id. (citing Tree Fruits,377 U.S. 58, 63 (1964)).
489. Id. (citing Am. Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 229-31 (1974)).
490. Id. at 226 n.25 (citing IBEWLocal 501, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951).
491. Id. (quoting IBEW Local 501, 341 U.S. at 705 (footnote omitted)). The Allied
InternationalCourt "omitted" the precedents the Supreme Court relied on in IBEW Local 501 to

uphold the constitutionality of Section 8(b)(4), see id, precedents that Part Id of this Article
explained demonstrate that then-existing union power to inflict tangible harms to discipline
members and employees were key in finding limits on union protests to be constitutional. See supra
notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
492. See Am. Radio Ass'n, 419 U.S. at 228-31; see also Brief for Petitioners at 8-9, Am. Radio
Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (No. 73-748) ("The Association filed suit in an Alabama state court seeking to
enjoin the picketing as tortious under Alabama law. The basis for the claim was that the
unions[' conduct] constituted unlawful interference with the contractual relationship between
Association members and the companies operating the picketed vessels, and the Association
members' right to carry on their lawful business.").
493. See Am. Radio Ass'n, 419 U.S. at 229 (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt,
Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 289-90, 293 (1957)).
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in InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt marked
494
the "culminati[on]" of its review of state law restrictions on picketing
and that Vogt "endorsed the view that picketing involves more than an
expression of ideas, 495 and "referred to our 'growing awareness that
these cases involved not so much questions of free speech as review of
the balance struck by a State between picketing that involved more than
"publicity" and competing interests of state policy.', 496 The Court in its
American Radio Association decision then found that in Vogt it
previously had "concluded that our cases 'established a broad field in
which a State, in enforcing some public policy, whether of its criminal or
its civil law, and whether announced by its legislature or its courts, could
constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing aimed at preventing
effectuation of that policy."' 4 97 Based on Vogt, the American Radio
Association decision found that Alabama could enjoin the peaceful
picketing at issue in that case.4 98 In doing so, American Radio
Association expressly relied on the aspects of Vogt that were based on
the non-communicative aspects of picketing and on balancing the
protest
constitutional rights to engage in such "non-communicative"
4 99
law.
criminal
or
civil
the
of
conduct against the public policy
The federal and state policies considered by the U.S. Supreme
Court in its decisions so far discussed in this Subpart involved policies
aimed at secondary boycotts that interfered with the business of
"neutrals" or "wrongfully interfered" with businesses. Any argument
that those types of policies are somehow entitled to more deference than
others would have to distinguish union protest from the protests at issue
in NAACP v. ClaiborneHardware Co.," an October 1982 ruling made
six months after Allied International."1 In Claiborne Hardware, the
Court ignored Allied International's language about deference to other
policymakers, and even Allied International's specific reference to
opposing a policy through means other than a boycott "infringing upon
the rights of others," when the Court struck down a challenge to a state
at 230.
494. See id.
495. Id.at 229 (emphasis added) (citing Vogt, 354 U.S. at 289).
496. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Vogt, 354 U.S. at 290).
497. Id. at 229-30 (quoting Vogt, 354 U.S. at 293).
498. See id. at 230.
499. See id. at 231-32 (pointing to non-communicative factors like "nature, location, and effect
of picketing," and noting the public policy "based on the state interest in preserving its economy
against the stagnation" due to "disruption" by picketing).
500. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
501. This Article's Author acknowledges that other scholars have previously pointed out the
difference between the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of the protests in ClaiborneHardware and
the treatment of picketing by unions, including the union political protest at issue in Allied
International.See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
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supreme court ruling against just such a boycott. 0 2 The Court in
Claiborne Hardware justified that discrepancy based on the "balance
struck by Congress" rationale first posited by Justice Blackmun in his
concurrence in Safeco.50 3 The Court quoted that concurrence and cited
the Court's reliance on it in Allied International,declaring: "Secondary
boycotts and picketing by labor unions may be prohibited, as part of
'Congress' striking of the delicate balance between union freedom of
expression and the ability of neutral employers, employees, and
consumers to remain free from coerced participation in industrial
strife."' 5 ° The Court in Claiborne Hardware did not offer any further
guidance regarding what union protest could, and could not, be
constitutionally prohibited.
There also was not any explanation of the Congressional balance
and how to apply it when, in the Eliason & Knuth of Arizona decision
that (at present) is one of the leading precedents on the scope of lawful
union protest, dissenting Board Members Schaumber and Hayes relied
on the "Congressional balance rationale" to contend that the large
stationary banners the union used to protest in that case should have
been found unlawful. 55 Near the end of their dissent, these Board
Members cited (and quoted) Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Safeco
and the Supreme Court's decision in Allied International.0 6 In their
footnote 40 following this statement, dissenting Members Schaumber
and Hayes discussed the language in NAACP v. ClaiborneHardware,°7
in which the Supreme Court distinguished the handbilling and other
boycott activity at issue in that case from protest by labor organizations
on the ground that the "delicate balance" of Congress justified existing
prohibitions on the latter.0 8 This rationale for upholding the
502. Allied Int'l, 456 U.S. 212, 226-27 (1982); ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S. at 888-89, 912,
934. In the opinion of this Article's Author, that implicit ruling in ClaiborneHardware that it is
irrelevant that means exist, other than a boycott, to protest policies makes it unnecessary to discuss
that "other means" rationale as one that justifies as constitutional the NLRA's restrictions on labor
protest.
503. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 912 (quoting Safeco, 447 U.S. at 617-18
(Blackmun, J., concurring)).
504. Id. at 912 (quoting Safeco, 447 U.S. at 617-18 (Blackmun, J., concurring)) (citing Allied
Int'l, 456 U.S. at 222-23 & n.20).
505. See Eliason & Knuth of Ariz., 355 N.L.R.B. 797, 813-15, 821 (2010) (Schaumber &
Hayes, Members, dissenting).
506. Id. (quoting Safeco, 447 U.S. at 617-18 (Blackmun, J., concurring)) (citing Allied Int'l,
456 U.S. at 222-23 & n.20).
507. See supra text accompanying note 504.
508. See Eliason & Knuth of Ariz., 355 N.L.R.B. at 821 & n.40 (Schaumber & Hayes,
Members, dissenting) (discussing the distinction, for First Amendment purposes, between labor
protest and the NAACP's similar means of protest in that instant case (citing Claiborne Hardware,
458 U.S. at 912 & n.47)).
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constitutionality of prohibitions on labor protest, that such prohibitions
are the result of a "delicate balance" fashioned by Congress, °9 is
problematic for multiple reasons. One is that, as previously noted, the
Supreme Court has referred to this "balance" only in summary
descriptions of "union freedom of expression" weighed against "coerced
participation" in labor disputes.51 ° Meanwhile, in other decisions that
also at least arguably involved "coerced participation" of "neutrals" in
labor disputes, such as the Tree Fruits decision permitting picketing of a
neutral aimed at asking consumers not to purchase a specific product5 '
and the DeBartolo decision permitting handbilling urging consumers to
not do any business with a neutral," 2 the Court did not mention
Congress's "balance" and instead discussed only whether Congress had
expressed clear intent to bar these forms of protest. The Court has
certainly never offered guidance on how much weight should be given to
each side of the balance and also has not explained why freedom of
expression was outweighed by the policy of ensuring that third parties
were not affected by such expression. And why expression is of lesser
weight in, apparently, all situations, no matter how many third parties
are affected or how many employees are having their interests advanced
by the expression. With the Court failing to explain or define the
"balance," other courts and the NLRB have no way to apply it to
determine whether forms of protest not yet considered by the Supreme
Court are or are not prohibited by the NLRA consistent with the First
Amendment. The result is that such decision-makers disagree about the
5 13
permissibility of means of protest such as large stationary banners,
mock funerals, 14 and inflatables,515 among others.
509.

See id at 821.

510.
511.
512.
513.

See supra notes 503-04, 506 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
Compare Overstreet ex rel. NLRB v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local Union No. 1506,

409 F.3d 1199, 1210-19 (9th Cir. 2005), and Eliason & Knuth of Ariz., 355 N.L.R.B. at 799-811

(holding that union banners did not violate the NLRA), with Eliason & Knuth ofAriz., 355 N.L.R.B.
at 813-821 (Schaumber & Hayes, Members, dissenting) (maintaining that union banners violated
Section 8(b)(4)).
514. Compare Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259, 1265-66
(11 th Cir. 2005), and Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 15, 346 N.L.R.B. 199, 199-200 (2006)
(decision of the Board holding that mock funerals violated Section 8(b)(4)), with Sheet Metal
Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 436-39 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (reversing the
immediately-preceding cited Board decision and holding that the mock funeral could not be found
to violate the NLRA based on that protest's similarity to protests found constitutionally protected by
the Supreme Court in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. (citing 512 U.S. 753, 758, 773-74,
776 (1994))), and Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707, 714-25 (2000). These Board and D.C.
Circuit decisions in Sheet Metal Workers Local 15 are discussed earlier in this Article. See supra
notes 121-36 and accompanying text.
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Meanwhile, in the Roberts Court era, "delicate balance[s]" struck
by Congress or other legislatures have received little deference when the
16
Court found federal statutes inconsistent with the First Amendment.
As has been pointed out by other scholars, most notably Professor
Catherine Fisk and Jessica Rutter and then-student, now Department of
Justice attorney Zoran Tasi6, the Roberts Court has ignored
Congressional or other legislatures' balances in complex regulatory
statutes517 in decisions such as Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,5 18 McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission,519 and
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.52 ° This Article will now highlight how in
Citizens United and Sorrell the Court in effect found legislative balance
was irrelevant to or much overweighed by First Amendment
considerations. In Citizens United, the Court invalidated as contrary to
the First Amendment provisions of the comprehensive Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA") that prohibited corporate and
union "expenditures" expressly advocating "election or defeat" of a
candidate for defined federal offices.521 More broadly, the Court
majority held, and overruled its precedent in Austin v. Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce 2 2 to do so, that "[g]overnment may not suppress
political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity. '523 The
Court majority made these First Amendment rulings even though, as
Justice Stevens noted in his dissent joined by three other Justices,
Congress had restricted corporate campaign spending since the 1907
Tillman Act.5 24 The dissenting Justices decried how "[t]he Court
operate[d] with a sledge hammer" in "strik[ing] down one of Congress'
most significant efforts to regulate the role that corporations and unions
play in electoral politics. 5 25 The dissenters further pointed out how
"Congress crafted BCRA in response to a virtual mountain of research
515. Compare Tucker v. City of Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457, 462-64 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that
union's use of inflatable rat to protest was protected by the First Amendment), with Laborers' E.
Region Org. Fund, JD(NY)-22-05, Case No. 29-CC-1422, 2005 WL 1467350, at *14-18 (N.L.R.B.
Div. of Judges June 14, 2005) (finding union's inflatable rat was not constitutionally protected and
was illegal "signal picketing").
516. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 572 U.S. 185, 227 (2014); Sorrell v.
IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557, 579-80 (2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558
U.S. 310, 318-19, 371-72 (2010).
517. See Fisk & Rutter, supra note 3, at 315-16; Tasi6, supra note 2, at 264-71.
518. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
519. 572 U.S. 185 (2014).
520. 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
521. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 318-21, 372.
522. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
523. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
524. Id.at 394-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
525. Id. at 399.
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on the corruption that previous legislation had failed to avert. 526 Other
language in the dissent referenced Congress's "wisdom and experience
in these matters, 5 27 along with its "reasoned judgment" and "years of
bipartisan deliberation. 5 28 All such Congressional consideration and
statutory crafting were, according to the Citizens United majority,
outweighed by their 2 First Amendment concerns over restriction on
corporate expression.1 1
The same was true in the Court's decision in Sorrell. In that case,
the Court struck down as violative of the First Amendment a Vermont
statute that prohibited the sale of data on patient prescriptions, with
exceptions such as for "educational communications," and that
prohibited pharmaceutical manufacturers from using such data for
marketing.53 ° According to the "legislative findings" that accompanied
the lengthy and complex Vermont statute, its multiple purposes included
reducing the likelihood that doctors' medical decisions would be based
on "biased" marketing information provided by pharmaceutical
companies, over-prescription of relatively expensive drugs marketed by
pharmaceutical firms rather than less costly generic drugs, and trying to
prevent increases in health care costs caused by pharmaceutical
marketing as aided by access to patients' prescription information.5 31
According to the Court majority, the statute's furthering of these
purposes was outweighed by their view that "[slpeech in aid of
pharmaceutical marketing... is a form of expression protected by the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment."5'32 Therefore, Justice
Kennedy stated in his majority opinion, "Vermont's statute must be
subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny. The law cannot satisfy that
standard."5'33 Justice Kennedy found that "[t]he statute.., disfavors
marketing, that is, speech with a particular content[, and m]ore than that,
the statute disfavors specific speakers, namely pharmaceutical
manufacturers. 53 4 Consequently, because the Vermont statute was
"directed at certain content and [was] aimed at particular speakers," it
was unconstitutional under the First Amendment.53 5

526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.

Id. at 400.
Id. at 461.
Id.at 462.
See id.
at 371-72 (majority opinion).
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 561-64, 580 (2011).
Id. at 560-61 (summarizing legislative findings).
See id. at 557.
Id.
Id.at 564.
See id. at 567-72.
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As in Citizens United, it was left to the dissenting Justices, this time
in an opinion by Justice Breyer joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan,
to discuss that the First Amendment should not always override
legislative balances.5 36 The dissent pointed out that past Supreme Court
precedents "reflect[ed] the democratic importance of permitting an
elected government to implement through effective programs policy
'
choices for which the people's elected representatives have voted."537
Later, when focusing on the Vermont statute at issue, the dissent
observed that "the statute's requirements form part of a traditional,
comprehensive regulatory regime"5'38 and that problems identified in the
legislative record "required the legislature to make judgments about
whether and how to ameliorate these problems[, because] it is the job of
regulatory agencies and legislaturies to make just these kinds of
judgments."53' 9 The dissent even used the term "balance" to describe
what Vermont legislators sought with this statute, stating that
"Vermont's attempts to ensure a 'fair balance' of information is no
different from the [Food and Drug Administration's] similar
requirement. 5 4° But similar to Citizens United, the Court majority
concluded that legislative judgments and even fair balances could not
justify restrictions on rights pharmaceutical companies were found to
possess under the First Amendment. 4 1 If the "deference to legislative
balance" rationale is not obsolete as a ground for rejecting First
Amendment challenges to statutes, the current U.S. Supreme Court will
have to distinguish Citizens United and Sorrell in explaining why.
B. The Warshawsky Interpretationof
the Law on FederalRestrictions is Unfair to Workers
Respect for First Amendment rights and values, and the abovediscussed lack of a convincing rationale for overriding them,5 42 are
reasons enough to recognize that the First Amendment protects labor
protest even when, intentionally or unintentionally, that protest causes
workers to withhold their labor. But another very important reason is
that the current law on labor protest, as embodied by the D.C. Circuit's

536. See id. at 580-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
537. Id. at 583.
538. Id. at 586.
539. Id.at 598.
540. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1), (e)(5)(ii) (2018)).
541. See id. at 577-79 (majority opinion).
542. See supraPart V.A.
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1999 Warshawsky decision,543 is unfair to workers, not only as protesters
but as the audience to labor protest.
Consider the current rules governing restrictions on labor protest.
The U.S. Supreme Court in its 1988 decision in DeBartolo established
that union handbilling aimed at persuading consumers not to shop or
otherwise transact business with a targeted entity could not be prohibited
by federal law, because that might violate the First Amendment. 5" The
DeBartolo Court in pointing out that "[t]he handbills made clear that the
union was seeking only a consumer boycott... [of] mall tenants, not a
secondary strike by their employees"54' 5 did leave open whether
handbilling that did seek a work stoppage could be forbidden. The D.C.
Circuit in Warshawsky at least arguably extended the scope of union
protest that could be proscribed by holding that when union handbilling
caused one or more employees to refrain from working that was
sufficient to prove the union had an illegal intent to cause an employee
not to work, and protest with that intent could be prohibited.54 6 In sum,
any amount of union persuasion of consumers is permissible, even if
(unlikely, but not impossible) all consumers cease doing business with
an entity. But if a union persuades even one employee to refrain from
performing any work for an employer, it's likely the union's persuasion
would be found to violate federal law.
A similar stark contrast exists with regard to union persuasion of
owners or managerial employees. Union appeals to enterprises, or their
managers, to not engage with a specific enterprise have for decades been
recognized as being outside the prohibitions of federal labor laws. The
U.S. Supreme Court in 1959 in Local 1976, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters v. NLRB" 7 held that "a union is free to approach an
employer to persuade him to engage in a boycott [of another enterprise],
so long as it refrains from the specifically prohibited means of coercion
through inducement of employees" and that the NLRA is not violated if

543. See Warshawsky & Co. v. NLRB, 182 F.3d 948, 951-56 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
544. See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's DeBartolo
decision).
545. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 571 (1988).
546. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text (discussing majority's opinion in
Warshawsky).
547. 357 U.S. 93 (1958). One of those 1959 amendments, the enactment of NLRA Section
8(e), did abrogate this Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters decision's rulings on socalled "hot cargo" clauses through which employers contractually agree to "cease doing business"
with any other person. See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (2012);
id. § 158 amends. (1959-Subsec. (e)); see also Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456
U.S. 645, 654-60 (1982) (discussing the enactment and effect of Section 8(e)).
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that employer acceded to the union's request. 48 The Supreme Court
reaffirmed these rules after the enactment of the 1959 amendments to the
NLRA in its 1964 decision in National Labor Relations Board v.
Servette, Inc. 549 In Servette, the Court, reversing the Ninth Circuit, held
that a union's requests to supermarket managers to not stock products
distributed by another, secondary employer were not prohibited by
Section 8(b) of the NLRA.55 ° The Court reasoned that the union was
asking these managers to "make a managerial decision which the Board
found was within their authority to make," and that requesting such a
decision was not covered by the NLRA. 55 1 For the reasons discussed
previously in Part IV of this Article, under current federal protections
from discipline for union member employees, unions now usually have
no more power or authority to "induce" or "coerce" those employees to
decide not to work than the union in Servette had to compel
the supermarket managers to decide not to stock products distributed
by Servette.552
For reasons explained earlier in this Article, unions can no longer
"induce" employees, through tangible discipline, to refrain from
working, 553 and unions in most situations cannot count on workers'
"group loyalty" to respond automatically to a labor protest. 554
Consequently, contrary to Justice Douglas's statement in Wohl,
employees will no longer stop working simply because of the "presence"
of union picketing "irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are
being disseminated., 555 And contrary to Justice Stevens's statement in
Safeco, a twenty-first-century employee's reaction to union picketing
will not be an "automatic response to a signal, rather than a reasoned
response to an idea. ' 556 In the twenty-first century, employees can and
will work in disregard of pickets or other labor protest, and even unions
members can and will resign from a union in order to work for an
employer targeted by a union.55 7 Unions must rely on communication to
548.

Local 1976, UnitedBhd. of Carpenters,357 U.S. at 98-99.

549.
550.
551.

See 377 U.S. 46, 50-54 (1964).
Id. at 49-51.
Id. at 51.

552.

See supra Part IV.

553. See supra notes 408-42 and accompanying text (discussing legal limits on unions' power
to discipline members and employees they represent).
554. See supra notes 464-81 and accompanying text.
555. See Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
556. NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
557. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 492 (United ParcelService, Inc.), 346
N.L.R.B. 360, 363 (2006); Chi. Reg'l Council of Carpenters, ID(NY)-23-10, Case No. 13-CB-
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and persuasion of workers, as unions must with consumers and with
owners and managers.
And workers have a right to listen, to read, and to respond to the
message they witness. Indeed, other protesters can appeal to workers to
refrain from working,558 and can even interfere with employees' work to
some extent, 559 and still be protected by the First Amendment.
Even labor organizations and their agents can seek to persuade
customers not to buy, vendors not to sell, and other managers not to
transact business. But when agents of labor organizations ask employees
not to work, First Amendment protection vanishes, and the request is
illegal. A decision not to work should not be treated any differently than
a decision not to buy, not to sell, or not to transact business. But it is,
whenever one or more agents of a labor organization appeal to one or
more workers to make that decision not to work. No court or
administrative agency has ever offered a justification for treating
workers' decisions differently.
Like consumers and managers, employees are certainly capable of
deciding how they will respond to the message they receive. As the
NLRB and courts have recognized in other contexts, individual workers
are fully capable of making individual judgments even when faced with
a union, or even an employer and a union, encouraging worker(s) to do
something. For example, multiple decisions have held that an employer
can inform its employees that it would like to have a collective
19310, at *8-10 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges July 1, 2010); Gen. Truck Drivers Union Local No. 952,
JD(SF)-30-06, Case No. 21-CB-13609, at *9-11 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges May 30, 2006); U.S.
Gov't Office of the Gen. Counsel, NLRB, Advice Memorandum on Pennsylvania American Water
Company Cases 6-CA-37197, -37198, -37199, -37202 Utility Workers Union of America, AFLCIO Case 6-CB-11730, at 3-7 (May 27, 2011); U.S. Gov't Office of the Gen. Counsel, NLRB,
Advice Memorandum on Writers Guild of America-West (ABC, Inc.) Case 31-CB-12839 Writers
Guild of America-East (ABC, Inc.) Case 31-CB-12840, at 7-8 (Mar. 29,2011).
558. For example, anti-abortion/pro-life activists have expressed to, or at least in the presence
of, employees working for facilities that provide abortions their wishes that these employees will
change their minds about participating in such work (see, for example, Dean Olsen, First Day of
Surgical Abortions in Springfield Attracts Handful of Protesters, ST. J.-REG. (Aug. 4, 2016, 8:37
PM),
https://www.sj-r.com/news/20160804/first-day-of-surgical-abortions-in-springfield-attractshandful-of-protesters) and are involved with seeking and sometimes succeeding with getting
employees who work in facilities who perform abortions to "transition" out of those jobs (see, for
example, Maryann Gogniat Eidemiller, Pro-Life Nonprofit Helps Ex-Abortion Workers, OSV
NEWSWEEKLY
(Jan.
7,
2015),
https://www.osv.com/OSVNewsweekly/Bylssue/Article/
Tabld/735/ArtMID/13636/ArticleID/16720/Pro-life-nonprofit-helps-ex-abortion-workers.aspx).
559. See, e.g., Dakota Access, L.L.C. v. Iowa Citizens for Cmty. Improvement, No. 4:16-cv00482-RGE-CFB, 2016 WL 8902579, at *3-4 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 30, 2016) (denying company's
request for temporary restraining order to halt non-violent protest of pipeline that was "disrupting"
construction work); Hous. Works, Inc. v. City of New York, 72 F. Supp. 2d 402, 406, 421-22
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that conduct of activists who interfered with campaign employees' work
was protected by First Amendment).
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bargaining agreement with a union and that it will make one if a
majority of those employees indicate support for that union. 56' Every
worker should similarly be permitted to exercise their judgment when a
labor organization-through picketing, handbilling, bannering, or by any
means-expresses to an employee they should refrain from working.
This Subpart's emphasis on union persuasion of employees
suggests what will now be announced openly: where labor protest
prevents or would reasonably be understood as threatening to prevent
workers or consumers from acting as they wish, it is appropriate it not be
protected by the First Amendment. This is consistent with statements in
former NLRB Member Wilma Liebman's concurring opinions, 56 later
repeated in Board holdings562 and in Second,5 63 Ninth,5 64 and D.C.
Circuit 56 5 decisions, maintaining that the key to constitutionally holding

labor protest to be unprotected and unlawful are elements of
"confrontation" or "intimidation" of persons seeking to deal with an
entity. Confrontation was also required to find that there was "signal
picketing," at least when that doctrine was first established as part of the
definition of picketing,5 66 and coercive confrontation should always be
required when applying "signal picketing" to find that any type of labor
protest should be proscribed.
To determine if such confrontation or intimidation is present, the
in
same "reasonableness" standard should be used for these as is used 567
labor law for deciding if employer expression or conduct is coercive
560. See, e.g., Coamo Knitting Mills, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 579, 581 (1964); see also Dana Corp.,
356 N.L.R.B. 256, 259-60 & n. 11 (2010) (relying on Coamo Knitting and Tecumseh Corrugated
Box in upholding an agreement under which an employer expressed to its employees it would
remain neutral during the union's organizing campaign and would bargain with the union if a
majority of employees chose it to represent them), enforced sub nom Montague v. NLRB, 698 F.3d
307 (6th Cir. 2012); Tecumseh Corrugated Box Co., 333 N.L.R.B. 1, 7-8 (2001) (holding it lawful
for employer to tell employees at a meeting that employer "liked working with unions").
561. See, e.g., The Ranches at Mt. Sinai, 346 N.L.R.B. 1251, 1253 n.5 (2006); Sheet Metal
Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 15, 346 N.L.R.B. 199, 200 (2006) (Liebman, Member, concurring).
562. See, e.g., Eliason & Knuth ofAriz., 355 N.L.R.B. 797, 803-05 (2010).
563. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Furniture Workers, 337 F.2d 936, 940 (2d Cit. 1964).
564. See, e.g., Overstreet ex rel. NLRB v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local Union No. 1506,
409 F.3d 1199, 1202-03, 1210-12 (9th Cit. 2005).
565. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 437-38
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
566. See supra Part III.
567. See, e.g., S.Bakeries, L.L.C., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 64, at *4 (Aug. 4, 2016) ("[E]mployees
would reasonably understand the message [of employer's General Manager at captive audience
meeting] as a threat of plant closure."), enforced in relevantpart, 871 F.3d 811, 823, 828 (8th Cir.
2017); Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 835, 851 (1999) ("[T]he Board applies the objective
standard of whether the remark would reasonably tend to interfere with the free exercise of
"),enforced in relevant part, 233 F.3d 831, 838-839, 845 (4th Cit. 2000);
employee rights ....
United Charter Serv., Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 150, 150 (1992) ("In determining whether a respondent has
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or if employer policies might be unfair labor practices.568 And just as the
"result" or "effect" of a union losing a representation election is not
sufficient in itself to prove the fact that the employer committed unfair
labor practices during an election campaign,569 so a result from labor
protest that one or more employees refrain from performing work should
not be sufficient to prove the protest was intimidating or coercive.
Therefore, the NLRB and courts should not follow the D.C. Circuit's
ruling in Warshawsky7 ° that a secondary's employees failing to work in
response to a union handbilling is sufficient proof that the union had an
illegal intent and the protest was illegal.
The current law on labor protest, especially if the Warshawsky
decision is accepted and followed, allows for differential treatment of
identical communication, based only on whether the targeted audience is
workers, rather than consumers, owners or managers, or the public. To
have constitutional protection depend on the recipients of a message not
being workers should not be continued any longer in the twenty-first
century. The First Amendment should fully protect workers to the same
extent as it protects other inhabitants of the United States. It also should
protect worker organizations as much as it protects other persons who
group together to express, protest, and persuade. The statutory
restrictions on worker organizations that violate these constitutional
rights of communication and persuasion should and must be ended.

created an impression of surveillance, the Board applies the following test: whether employees
would reasonably assume from the statement in question that their union activities have been placed
under surveillance.").
568. Boeing Co., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 154, at *3 (Dec. 14, 2017) (determining that the first step
for evaluating lawfulness of facially neutral employer policy or rule is whether the policy, "when
reasonably interpreted, would potentially interfere with the exercise of NLRA rights").
569. See, e.g., Medieval Knights, L.L.C., 350 N.L.R.B. 194, 194-95 (2007); TVI, Inc., 337
N.L.R.B. 1039, 1039 (2002); id.at 1039-40 (Liebman, Member, dissenting) (providing examples of
decisions in which the Board expressly rejected claims of unfair labor practices that were alleged to
have led the union to lose a representation election); see also Edgar L. Landen t/aSpeed Mail Serv.,
251 N.L.R.B. 476 app. at 485 (1980) (referring to his conclusion that an employee was not a
supervisor, AU Thomas A. Ricci criticized an argument the union made by stating, "[t]he Union
lost the election; does that outcome prove, as the brief suggests, that the Respondent brought about
such results by illegal conduct?"); U.S. Gov't Office of the Gen. Counsel, NLRB, Advice
Memorandum on Savage Fueling Corporation Cases 13-CA-182757 and 13-CA-185688, at 1, 5-6,
11-12 (May 4, 2017) (recommending dismissal of two unfair labor practice claims, even to
reconsider the scope of a legal rule, in a case in which the union claimed to have lost an election
based on alleged unfair labor practices).

570. Warshawsky & Co. v. NLRB, 182 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also supra notes 84-102
and accompanying text (discussing Warshawsky).
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VI. CONCLUSION

In the Roberts Court 2018 First Amendment decision in Janus v.
AFSCME, the Supreme Court majority asserted that "when a federal or
state law violates the Constitution, the American doctrine of judicial
review requires us to enforce the Constitution.... In holding that these
laws violate the Constitution, we are simply enforcing the First
Amendment as properly understood. 5 71 Agencies and courts should now
apply these same principles to the federal restrictions on labor protestset forth in Section 8(b)(4) and 8(b)(7) of the federal Labor
Management Relations Act 572-- as these are also laws that violate a

"proper understanding" of the First Amendment, at least as they are
currently interpreted.
The justifications in twentieth century Supreme Court decisions for
holding otherwise are no longer viable, as explained at length in Part V
of this Article,57 3 except in cases in which coercive physical
confrontation and intimidation prevent workers (and others) from
choosing to work or otherwise transact business with the target of the
protest. In cases in which picketing or other labor protest is not
physically confrontational or intimidating, but rather expresses a
message seeking to persuade employees not to perform work, that
expression should be recognized as protected by the First Amendment.
Such expression might successfully persuade one or more employees to
refrain from working; or, it might not. The response of workers would
depend on many factors, perhaps including the persuasiveness of the
union's message and the appeal of its cause, and always including the
attitudes and sympathies of the workers receiving the message. But how
workers respond to a labor protest message should never depend on
coercion imposed by federal law, as it unconstitutionally does now.

571.
(2018).

Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 n.28

572.

See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(b)(4), 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4),

158(b)(7) (2012).
573.

See infra Part V.
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